Preemptive war

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Preemptive war has been defined as a "military action undertaken absent an imminent threat or ongoing attack by an aggressor ... a decision to go to war without clear and convincing evidence of the need for us to defend ourselves against an imminent attack."[1]


In January 2004, the matter of preemptive war initiated by the Bush administration in pursuit of alleged terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein was pushed into public discourse for U.S. presidential election, 2004 by George W. Bush's former Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill, the main source for the upcoming book The Price of Loyalty by Ron Suskind, a former Wall Street reporter.[2]

According to O'Neill, from the moment of the "very first National Security Council meeting, ... 'From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go,' says O'Neill, who adds that going after Saddam was topic A 10 days after the inauguration - eight months" prior to September 11, 2001. "'From the very first instance, it was about Iraq. It was about what we can do to change this regime,' says Suskind. 'Day one, these things were laid and sealed.'"


Quotable Quotes

Preemptive war "punishes the defenseless not for what they have done or are doing but for what they might have done or could do." -- Eduardo Galeano, PaxHumana, September 2003.


"Described as "preventive defense" or "extended deterrence" by its supporters--but decried as "a new form of gunboat diplomacy" by its detractors--a new program called the "Counterproliferation Initiative" [Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC 18] was unveiled in December 1993 by then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin.

"There was considerable controversy over what "counterproliferation" meant. But it was widely interpreted as indicating that the United States--having recently demonstrated overwhelming military superiority in the Gulf War--would now flex its muscles even further, looking into the ways and means of preemptively striking regional troublemakers or would-be attackers.

"Although there was talk of building conventional weapons capable of destroying deeply buried targets like command centers (Aspin said both new strategies and new military capabilities were needed), the initiative envisioned the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defeat chemical or biological weapons. The idea, simply, was to "locate, neutralize, or destroy" others' weapons of mass destruction before they could be used. For the first time, the United States openly added targets in the Third World to its nuclear-weapons targeting plan.

"Now [April 2001], after eight years of reality, the initiative has morphed into something much less than promised. Author Henry Sokolski describes the process.

"The Fate of President Bill Clinton's "Counterproliferation Initiative" was tethered to its strategic assumptions. An initial interest in devising plans for preemptive strikes against foreign proliferation activities simply ignored the American culture's bias against launching Pearl Harbor-like attacks. More important, the initiative at first presumed that some military-technical means could neutralize proliferation problems. And that, in fact, turned out to be inherently difficult, if not impossible."

Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001.


Other Related SourceWatch Resources

External Links

Preemptive War Against Iraq

Future Preemptive Actions