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From 1980 While it is difficult to November 1982draw much from this presentation, Allen was detailed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he it is worth noting that Iraq was deputy director of a continuity of government planning project. A colleague quoted Allen as saying during a COG meeting, "our job is to throw not among the Constitution out the windowenumerated priorities." His assignment to the COG project brought him into contact with [[Oliver NorthGeorge Tenet]], who was delegated to monitor COGa [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A99121-1997Mar20.html principal author of PPD-35.] In the Congressional Joint Inquiry Staff's (JIS's findings by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane) review of the September 11 attacks, JIS Staff Director [http://www. fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100802hill.html Eleanor Hill wrote]:
[Eclipse: The Last Days "PDD 35 was never amended despite language that required an annual review. As certain threats, including terrorism, increased in the late 1990s, none of the CIA"lower level" Tier 1 priorities were down-graded so that resources (money and people) could be reallocated. To much of the Intelligence Community, Mark Perry, 1992, peverything was a priority -- the U.S. wanted to know everything about everything all the time... 215the vagueness of PDD-35 quickly translated into an overburdened requirements system within the Intelligence Community.] "
Satellite photos and electronic intercepts indicating this alternative use were regarded as circumstantial and unconvincing to Brigadier General Buster Glosson, who had primary responsibility for targeting. Glosson's comment was that the assessment wasn't "worth a shit." A human source in Iraq, who had previously proven accurate warned the CIA that Iraqi intelligence had begun operating from the shelter. On February 11, Shelter Number 25 was added to the Air Force's attack plan. At 4:30 am the morning of February 13, two F-117 stealth bombers each dropped a 2,000 pound, laser-guided, GBU-27 munition on the shelter. The first cut through ten feet of reinforced concrete before a time-delayed fuze exploded. Minutes later the second bomb followed the path cut by the first bomb. [ CrusadeEclipse: The Untold Story Last Days of the Persian Gulf WarCIA, Mark Perry, 19931992, p. 284-285 ] In the shelter at the time of the bombing were hundreds of Iraqi civilians. More than 400 people, mostly women and children were killed215. Men and boys over the age of 15 had left the shelter to give the women and children some privacy. Jeremy Bowen, a BBC correspondent, was one of the first television reporters on the scene. Bowen was given access to the site and did not find evidence of military use. [ Report aired BBC 1, February 14, 1991 ]
While it is difficult to draw much from this presentation, it is worth noting that Iraq was not among the enumerated priorities. [[George Tenet]] was a [http://www.washingtonpostgovexec.com/wp-dyndailyfed/articles1205/A99121-1997Mar20.html principal author of PPD-35121405mm.htm A Government Executive article] In the Congressional Joint Inquiry Staff's (JISrecounting Allen's) review of history at the September 11 attacks, JIS Staff Director [http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100802hill.html Eleanor Hill wrote]CIA noted:
The Yom Kippur War / chrono re-ordering
"He <nowiki>[</nowiki>Allen<nowiki>]</nowiki> was a bit of a maverick; bright absolutely dedicated, on occasion short on diplomacy, and a workaholic." <nowiki>[</nowiki> ''A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA'', Duane R. Clarridge, Scribner, 1997, pg. 340 <nowiki>]</nowiki>
==Continuity of Government1998 Presentation to Japanese / PPD-35== Allen's June 22 1998 presentation entitled "Intelligence Community Overview For Japanese Visitors, Public Security Investigation Agency" was published July 2000 on the [http://cryptome.org/cia-ico.htm Cryptome website]. The presentation reviews "PDD-35," which set intelligence priorities. Providing strategic warning to US national interests was the highest priority, followed by supporting military commanders. Below the tiers of strategic intelligence and military support was a focus on "Rogue States" and "Strategic Nuclear Powers" and transnational issues, including: Proliferation Nuclear; Command and Control; Terrorism; Narcotics; Regional Conflict/Negotiation; and International Organized Crime. Pursuant to PDD-35, the slides note the establishment of the following "executive boards": Iran, Jul 96 ; China, Oct 96; North Korea, Jan 97; Cuba, Jan 97; and Russia, May 97. The slides note that in the "Tier II" or "Watch Tier" countries with potential for a major crisis in 6-12 months were Algeria, Angola, Burundi/Rwanda, Cambodia, Congo (Kinshasa), Haiti, and Indonesia.
==Iran Contra==
[Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA, Mark Perry, 1992, p. 216.]
==Gulf War: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amiriyah_shelter Bombing of Amiriyah Shelter]==
Allen supported the selection of bomb targets during the the first Gulf War. He coordinated intelligence with Colonel John Warden, who headed the Air Force's planning cell known as "Checkmate." On February 10, 1991 Allen presented his estimate to Col. Warden that Public Shelter Number 25 in the Southwestern Baghdad suburb of Amiriyah had become an alternative command post and showed no sign of being used as a civilian bomb shelter.
Satellite photos and electronic intercepts indicating this alternative use were regarded as circumstantial and unconvincing to Brigadier General Buster Glosson, who had primary responsibility for targeting. Glosson's comment was that the assessment wasn't "worth a shit." A human source in Iraq, who had previously proven accurate warned the CIA that Iraqi intelligence had begun operating from the shelter. On February 11, Shelter Number 25 was added to the Air Force's attack plan. At 4:30 am the morning of February 13, two F-117 stealth bombers each dropped a 2,000 pound, laser-guided, GBU-27 munition on the shelter. The first cut through ten feet of reinforced concrete before a time-delayed fuze exploded. Minutes later the second bomb followed the path cut by the first bomb. [ Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, 1993, p. 284-285 ]
In the shelter at the time of the bombing were hundreds of Iraqi civilians. More than 400 people, mostly women and children were killed. Men and boys over the age of 15 had left the shelter to give the women and children some privacy. Jeremy Bowen, a BBC correspondent, was one of the first television reporters on the scene. Bowen was given access to the site and did not find evidence of military use. [ Report aired BBC 1, February 14, 1991 ]
==Gulf War: Warning of War==
:"One high-level intelligence official on the [[National Intelligence Council]] (NIC), charged with advising the DCI, was more forward leaning than the analytic judgments published in the NID. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning Charles Allen on 25 July [1998] issued a 'warning of war' memorandum in which he stressed that Iraq had nearly achieved the capability to launch a corps-sized operation of sufficient mass to occupy much of Kuwait. The memo judged that the chances of a military operation of some sort at better than 60 percent."
==Gulf War: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amiriyah_shelter Bombing Continuity of Amiriyah Shelter]Government==
From 1980 to November 1982, Allen supported was detailed to the selection Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was deputy director of a continuity of bomb targets government planning project. A colleague quoted Allen as saying during a COG meeting, "our job is to throw the Constitution out the first Gulf Warwindow. He coordinated intelligence " His assignment to the COG project brought him into contact with Colonel John Warden[[Oliver North]], who headed the Air Forcewas delegated to monitor COG's planning cell known as "Checkmate." On February 10, 1991 Allen presented his estimate to Col. Warden that Public Shelter Number 25 in the Southwestern Baghdad suburb of Amiriyah had become an alternative command post and showed no sign of being used as a civilian bomb shelterfindings by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane.
==Australia==
From 1974 to 1977, he was stationed in Canberra, Australia, in an intelligence liasion capacity. Served under CIA Station Chiefs M. Corely Wonus (1934-1992) and [http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jdwalker.htm John Walker] (1921-2002).
==1998 Presentation to Japanese / PPD-35The Yom Kippur War== Allen's June 22 1998 presentation entitled "Intelligence Community Overview For Japanese Visitors, Public Security Investigation Agency" was published July 2000 on the [http://cryptome.org/cia-ico.htm Cryptome website]. The presentation reviews "PDD-35," which set intelligence priorities. Providing strategic warning to US national interests was the highest priority, followed by supporting military commanders. Below the tiers of strategic intelligence and military support was a focus on "Rogue States" and "Strategic Nuclear Powers" and transnational issues, including: Proliferation Nuclear; Command and Control; Terrorism; Narcotics; Regional Conflict/Negotiation; and International Organized Crime. Pursuant to PDD-35, the slides note the establishment of the following "executive boards": Iran, Jul 96 ; China, Oct 96; North Korea, Jan 97; Cuba, Jan 97; and Russia, May 97. The slides note that in the "Tier II" or "Watch Tier" countries with potential for a major crisis in 6-12 months were Algeria, Angola, Burundi/Rwanda, Cambodia, Congo (Kinshasa), Haiti, and Indonesia.
:"PDD 35 was never amended despite language that required an annual reviewAllen hasn't always been right, of course. He also has been catastrophically wrong. As certain threatsIn 1973, including terrorism, increased in the late 1990s, none of he reviewed intelligence showing Egypt and Syria running military exercises along the "lower level" Tier 1 priorities were down-graded so that resources (money Israeli border and people) could be reallocateddecided it was a bluff. To He wrote as much of in the Intelligence Community, everything was a priority -- the U.S. wanted President's Daily Brief that went to know everything about everything all the time..Richard Nixon.Shortly thereafter, the vagueness of PDD-35 quickly translated into an overburdened requirements system within two countries invaded Israel, launching the Intelligence CommunityYom Kippur War."
==External links==
