New Jersey election threats
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Contents
Voter registration
This section details threats to voters from and problems with the state's voter registration system. |
Things you can do: Add info on registration or other related topics. |
Verification, database and rejection
Notification and appeal
3rd party registration
NVRA implementation
Voter education
This section details past and potential election threats caused by the state's laws, regulations and practices on voter education, how to vote, information on elections, etc. |
Things you can do: Add info on registration or other related topics. |
Absentee and early voting
This section details problems with and threats to the state's absentee and early voting system. |
Things you can do: Add info on registration or other related topics. |
Voter suppression and intimidation
This section details problems and threats involving fraud, intimidation and suppression efforts. |
Things you can do: Add info on registration or other related topics. |
Deceptive practices laws
Voter caging, purging and other eligibility challenges
Voter intimidation and deception
Polling places and voting
This section details past and potential election threats caused by the state's laws, regulations and practices on election practices, polling places, workers, providing election equipment, etc. |
Things you can do: Add info on registration or other related topics. |
Poll worker training, recruitment and distribution
Voter ID requirements
Polling place accessibility and wait times
Voting machine and ballot distribution
Malfunctioning voting machinery
- November 4, 2008, Burlington County poll workers caused problems with voting machine, forcing voters to use paper ballots for the first hour of voting.[1]
- In October 2008 the New Jersey heard testimony that New Jersey's Sequoia voting machines are easily hacked[2].
- For an extensive log of voting machine problems, see the VotersUnite! report on election incidents.[3]
Ballot design
Provisional ballots
This section lists past and potential election threats caused by the state's laws, regulations and practices on provisional ballots. Particularly, what are the state's criteria for receiving a provisional ballot (including voting in the wrong precinct) and its procedures for verifying eligibility and then including those votes in the totals. |
Things you can do: Add info on registration or other related topics. |
Criteria
Eligibility verification
Ballots cast in wrong precinct
Vote verification and security
This section details past and potential election threats caused by the state's laws, regulations and practices on vote verification and security. |
Things you can do: Add info on registration or other related topics. |
Voting machine verification and security
- Oct. 6, 2008. A crucial report on the reliability of New Jersey's 10,000 electronic voting machines was kept from the public for more than six weeks. The machines were manufactured by Sequoia Voting System, which objected to the testing, arguing it could put their trade secrets at risk. Superior Court Judge Linda Feinberg in Trenton Union County allowed the examination after reports of discrepancies in several counties. Clerk Joanne Rajoppi said that without the independent analysis she is urging voters to "seriously consider" using absentee ballots.[4] The report, titled "Insecurities and Inaccuracies of the Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H DRE Voting Machine," was written by six computer scientists including Professor Andrew Appel of the Center for Information Technology Policy (CITP) at Princeton University. It found that the Sequoia AVC voting machines used it New Jersey made it easy to engage in undetectable election fraud:
- The AVC Advantage contains a computer. If someone installs a different computer program for that computer to run, it can deliberately add up the votes wrong. It's easy to make a computer program that steals votes from one party's candidates, and gives them to another, while taking care to make the total number of votes come out right. It's easy to make this program take care to cheat only on election day when hundreds of ballots are cast, and not cheat when the machine is being tested for accuracy. This kind of fraudulent computer program can modify every electronic "audit trail" in the computer. Without voter-verified paper ballots, it's extremely hard to know whether a voting machine (such as the AVC Advantage) is running the right program.
- It takes about 7 minutes, using simple tools, to replace the computer program in the AVC Advantage with a fraudulent program that cheats. We demonstrate this on the video.
- Even when it's not hacked to deliberately steal votes, the AVC Advantage has a few user-interface flaws. Therefore, sometimes the AVC Advantage does not properly record the intent of the voter. All known voting technologies have imperfect user interfaces, although some are worse than others. The public should beware of the argument that some people make, that "we should not replace the AVC Advantage with voting method X, because X is imperfect." The AVC Advantage's susceptibility to installation of a fraudulent vote-counting program is far more than an imperfection: it is a fatal flaw.[5]
The CITP researchers completed their report on September 2, 2008 but were forbidden until October 17 from publishing it by a court order that was eventually reversed on appeal.[6] The local elections board in Princeton also denied a request] by Appel and CITP fellow Grayson Barber to observe poll workers on election night, stating that the election is "too important" to permit extra people in the polling place. "In particular, they cited Andrew's status as an expert on Sequoia voting machines as a 'concern,'" Grayson noted.[7]
Andrew Appel and Grayson Barber, two Princeton-based e-voting researchers, were denied their request to view the vote counting process in New Jersey. The New Jersey Elections Board, which rejected their request, said the election was "too important" to allow outside observers of the count. However, Appel and Barber's request followed procedures spelled out in New Jersey election law that allow the Elections Board to offer "Challenger Badges" to those requesting to observe the election process.[8]
Appel and Ed Felton were the authors of a report commissioned by the state of New Jersey on Sequoia's AVC Advantage e-voting machines after serious problems were discovered with them. The AVC Advantage is a DRE voting machine with no voter verified paper trail.[9] Sequoia then threatened to sue Felton, Appel and several New Jersey officials, causing the officials to reverse course and cancel the report.[10]
In April 2008, however, a judge later approved the review of one of the machines used in New Jersey, the Sequoia AVC Advantage.[11][12][13]
On Oct. 2, 2008, the day the report was to be released, a judge issued a temporary gag order on it and the researchers as part of a separate lawsuit filed against Sequoia, effectively suppressing the report.[14] The report was finally authorized for release and was made public on Oct. 17, 2008. The report found that the AVC Advantage, used in 18 of New Jersey's 21 counties, can be hacked to alter vote counts in as little as seven minutes.[15]
Vote tabulation procedures
Recount procedures
Chain of custody of ballots and e-voting equipment
Election public official issues
Premature media race calling
Vote result challenge procedures
Articles and resources
See also
- The main page on election protection and reform organizations.
- All articles in the Election Protection Wiki project.
- For election day: Things citizens can do to monitor elections and If you are told you cannot vote.
References
- ↑ "Willingboro voting glitch fixed," Courier Post Online, November 4, 2008.
- ↑ "NJ State Supreme Court hears testimony," NJ Star Ledger, October 18, 2008
- ↑ This past problem and description are from the VotersUnite! Election Problem Log. Click through for included links to origin of report.
- ↑ Diane C. Walsh, "Delayed report on N.J. voting machines' reliability raises concerns," Star Ledger, Oct. 6, 2008.
- ↑ Andrew W. Appel1, Maia Ginsburg, Harri Hursti, Brian W. Kernighan1, Christopher D. Richards and Gang Tan (September 2, 2008). Insecurities and Inaccuracies of the Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H DRE Voting Machine. Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University. Retrieved on October 21, 2008.
- ↑ Andrew Appel (October 2, 2008). Judge Suppresses Report on Voting Machine Security. Freedom to Tinker weblog. Retrieved on October 21, 2008.
- ↑ Grayson Barber (October 10, 2008). Counting Electronic Votes in Secret. Freedom to Tinker weblog. Retrieved on October 21, 2008.
- ↑ Mike Masnick, "New Jersey Elections Board Says This Election Is Too Important To Allow Outside Observers," TechDirt, Oct. 10, 2008.
- ↑ Andrew Appel, "Judge Suppresses Report on Voting Machine Security," Freedom to Tinker, Oct. 2, 2008.
- ↑ Mike Masnick, "More On Sequoia's Legal Threats Against Ed Felten: The Intimidation Worked," TechDirt, Mar. 19, 2008.
- ↑ Diane Walsh, "Judge rules for limited testing of electronic voting machines," New Jersey Star Ledger, April 25, 2008.
- ↑ Mark Masnick, "New Jersey Court Says Independent Investigators Can Review E-Voting Machines," TechDirt, April 28, 2008.
- ↑ Andrew Appel, "Judge Suppresses Report on Voting Machine Security," Freedom to Tinker, Oct. 2, 2008.
- ↑ Andrew Appel, "Judge Suppresses Report on Voting Machine Security," Freedom to Tinker, Oct. 2, 2008.
- ↑ http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/ap/2008/10/17/judge-releases-report-on-nj-voting-machines "Judge releases report on NJ voting machines," Portfolio.com, Oct. 17, 2008.
External resources
Poll location
- GoVote.org locates your polling place and other voting information.
- Google map polling locations locates most polling location, may be missing or out of date.
Election Protection hotlines
- 866-OUR-VOTE (National Election Protection Hotline)
- 888-VE-Y-VOTA (Español)
- 800-966-5946 (AALDEF, Asian languages)
- 866-MYVOTE1 (Tom Joyner Hotline - VoterAction, NAACP National Voter Fund)
- 877-523-2792 (ACLU Voting Rights Project Hotline)
- 877-US4-OBAMA (Obama campaign Voter Hotline)
- 866-976-VOTE (McCain campaign Honest and Open Election hotline - leave a message)
- 877-GOCNN08 (CNN Voter Problem Tipline)
- 888-VOTE-TIP (VelvetRevolution Election Protection Hotline for fraud)
- 567-258-VOTE (Twitter Vote Report key in report or leave audio message)
Voting information
- Vote411.org from the League of Women Voters provides all kinds of information to help you vote.
Voting rights
- ACLU's "Know Your Voting Rights - State by State" -- printable brochures summarizing your voting rights, for most states.
- One-page know your rights summaries for 27 states from the AFL-CIO.
Voting requirements
- Click here to see the voter ID requirements in all states. From the National Conference of State Legislatures.
Election officials, election reform groups, and elected officials
- Why Tuesday? offers a page for New Jersey that helps locate New Jersey's elections officials, election reform groups, and elected officials, as well as a page titled Find a group in your area that lets you find similar information for other states.
Absentee voting
- Click here to request an absentee ballot. Go Vote Absentee is a project of the Women Donors Network.
Disabled voters
- Information for voters with disabilities from NDRN.
Student voting rights
- See New Jersey Student Voting Rights for a guide to student voting rights in New Jersey. See Student Voting Rights for a guide to other states. From the Brennan Center for Justice.
State ballot
- See how organizations you trust recommend you vote on ballot measures and other statewide contests at TransparentDemocracy.
Languages
- Help in other languages from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. 中文, 日本語, 한국어, Tagalog, Tiếng Việt, Español
Voting machines
- Verified Voting's New Jersey page, which provides detailed information on voting equipment in use in every county in New Jersey.