Advanced Voting Solutions Winvote
This page is part of the Election Protection Wiki,
- Main article: Voting machines
Design and operation
The Advanced Voting Solutions Winvote does NOT have a Federally-Qualified Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail Capability.
The WINVOTE is a tablet-like touch-screen voting terminal equipped with a wireless local area network (LAN), a 15-inch full color screen with ZOOM capabilities, and built-in battery backup power, modem, and printer. When operational in a live election environment, the WINvote terminal rests in a plastic voting booth/secrecy and transportation case. It is designed as a stand-alone system to function both as a traditional precinct voting device and as a non-geographic voting station.
Detailed Voting Process
Detailed Voting Process: After checking in at the polling place, the voter will approach one of the terminals. An election official will activate the machine. The voter will touch the "Click Here to Start" button on the welcome screen, and the ballot-marking process will begin.
The screen will display one race at a time, with available choices listed below the race name.
Write-in candidates can be selected by touching the "Write-In" button at the bottom of the choice list. After making a selection, touch the "Next" button on the bottom of the screen.
When all selection have been made, the voter will be taken to a summary screen that lists that name of each race and the option that was selected by the voter. If the voter wishes to change any of these races, he/she should simply touch the name of the race and make another selection. When the voter is satisfied with the summary screen, he/she should touch the red "Next" button on the bottom-right part of the screen. The next screen has a large red "VOTE" button. After touching that button, the ballot has been cast.
- May 2005: Mississippi. Batteries failed early in the election, taking down the machines.
- November 2003: Virginia. The software failed (machines crashed throughout, voters reported difficulty in getting their choices to record), the hardware failed (some machines required new batteries, some needed to be “jiggled” back into operation, modems failed to transmit data).
- November 2003: Mississippi. Voting computers at some polling places in District 29 failed to start up. Others overheated and broke down during the election, and not enough paper ballots were available to allow all voters to vote.
NASED Qualification Status
Articles and resources
Related SourceWatch articles
Note: This article was originally copied from the Electronic Frontier Foundation's fact sheet, "Electronic Voting Machine Information Sheet: Diebold Election Systems — AccuVote-TSx", Version 1.1 of October 29, 2006. See more EFF articles on voting machines at http://w2.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/protection.php
- Pearl turnout reported low; problems mar voting in Jackson's Precinct 36. The Clarion-Ledger. May 3, 2005. By Cathy Hayden.
- Operation Ballot Integrity. A Report by Fairfax County Republican Committee. January, 2004.
- Long lines, machine malfunctions mark today's voting. November 4, 2003; By Clay Harden.
- NASED Qualified Voting Systems (10/25/2006). National Association of State Election Directors.
References: Votersunite.org, http://www.votersunite.org/info/Danaherinthenews.pdf VerifiedVoting.org, http://verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5138
“Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine ,” Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University, September, 2006. See http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/. Diebold’s response may be found at http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/pdf/princetonstatement.pdf.
Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach, “Analysis of an Electronic Voting Machine”, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004. IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2004. See: http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf
“DRE Security Assessment, Volume 1, Computerized Voting Systems, Summary of Findings and Recommendations,” InfoSENTRY, 21 Nov. 2003. See: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/InfoSentry1.pdf
“Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technical Security Assessment Report,” Compuware Corporation, 21 Nov. 2003. See: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/compuware.pdf
“Risk Assessment Report: Diebold Accuvote-TS Voting System and Processes (redacted)”, Science Applications International Corporation SAIC-6099-2003-261, Sept. 2, 2003. See: http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/SBE
“Trusted Agent Report -- Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System,” RABA Technologies, Jan. 20, 2004. See: http://www.raba.com/text/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf