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*[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FA17Ak02.html When Sistani speaks, Bush listens], ''Asia Times'', January 17, 2004.
*Naomi Klein, [http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0122-06.htm Bush's Iraq: An Appointocracy], ''Globe & Mail'' (Canada), January 22, 2004: "Asked on Friday whether his plan to form an Iraqi government through appointed caucuses was headed toward a clash with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's call for direct elections, Mr. Bremer said he had no 'fundamental disagreement with him.' ... I'm not an election expert either, but I'm pretty sure there are differences here than cannot be refined. Ayatollah al-Sistani's supporters want every Iraqi to have a vote, and for the people they elect to write the laws of the country -- your basic, imperfect, representative democracy. ... Mr. Bremer wants his Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to appoint the members of 18 regional organizing committees. The committees will then select delegates to form 18 selection caucuses. These selected delegates will then further select representatives to a transitional national assembly. The assembly will have an internal vote to select an executive and ministers who will form the new government of Iraq. That, Bush said in his address, constitutes 'a transition to full Iraqi sovereignty.' ... Got that? Iraqi sovereignty will be established by appointees appointing appointees to select appointees to select appointees. Add to that the fact that Mr. Bremer was appointed to his post by President Bush and that Mr. Bush was appointed to his by the U.S. [[Supreme Court]], and you have the glorious new democratic tradition of the appointocracy: rule by appointee's appointee's appointees' appointees' appointees' selectees."
*Marc Erikson, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FA24Ak03.html Why Saddam's arrest ''did'' matter], ''Asia Times'', January 24, 2004: "The Saddam arrest could very well prove a turning point - for the worse only if collective US foreign and intelligence services' memory utterly fails. That - given customary State Department and [[CIA]] institutional lack of attention span - cannot, of course, be ruled out. The crucial issue is what policy the United States adopts toward elements of the Iraqi resistance cast loose by the capture of their nominal leader."