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'''Matthew M. Swetonic''' (commonly referred to as Matt Swetonic) worked is a prominent public relations operator, who specializes in [[Hill & Knowlton]]'s New York office between at least 1988 countering environmentalism and early 1991. In early 1991 he went to work health activism, and in providing crisis management for the [[E. Bruce Harrison Company]]large industry groups and corporations with poisoning or polluting problems.

In the 1970s he worked (possibly through [[Hill & Knowlton]]) for [[Johns-Manville Asbestos]] Co (J-M), then the world's largest asbestos manufacturer. J-M had long been fighting a rear-guard action to protect its asbestos business and to deny the serious adverse health effects of the asbestos fibres. This company also led the fight against adequate compensation for workers and others effected by the fibres.  Swetonic set up for J-M a front organisation known as the '''Asbestos Information Association'', and ran it as the nominal Executive Secretary (he later claimed "Executive President"). [http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=10701] Despite the lofty aims listed in its promotional material, the main purpose of this organisation was to counter, devalue or dismiss the growing scientific evidence implicating asbestos in serious disease conditions [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tnr96d00/pdf]. He is known to have been working in [[Hill & Knowlton]]'s New York office between 1971 and early 1991 (They were the main PR company for the tobacco industry, among others), and later went he joined the [[E. Bruce Harrison Company]] (EBH), which was then the most experienced PR company specializing in countering the environmental movement. EBH had been contracted for decades by the Chemical Manufacturer's Association to protect their pesticide interests following the publication of [[Rachel Carson]]'s book '[[Silent Spring]]' in 1962 which is having triggered the modern environmental movement.  In the early 1990s, EBH was swallowed up in a series of mergers and, not long after, Swetonic left to work as become a partner in the New York office of [[The Dilenschneider Group]]'s , which had split off from Hill & Knowlton (H&K). This was at a time when most of the larger PR, advertising and polling companies were involved in mergers, leverage-buy-outs (LBOs), and take-overs, combining eventually into the current three global media conglomerates - [[WPP]], [[Omnicom]], and [[Interpublic Group]]. These three global conglomerates now dominate the misinformation business.  In addition to his asbestos and tobacco experience, Matt Swetonic was also employed on the Agent Orange and dioxin controversy by sections of the chemical industry (through H&K) for many years. He also spent many years working for the tobacco Industry -- specifically for [RJ Reynolds Tobacco] -- both on countering the movement to ban public smoking, and on the promotion of their 'Premier brand' nicotine delivery system. Later, with the Dilenschneider Group, he also worked for Philip Morris.  ===The Asbestos Years===During the years of World War II, and for nearly two decades after, asbestos was widely promoted as a "wonder material" because it could be woven or incorporated as reinforcing into other composite materials. It was inflammable and resistant to most chemicals. The first scientist to raise serious concerns about asbestos was Dr. Irving J. Selikoff at the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine. Selikoff's growing alarm at the danger of the fibres occurred at roughly the time that scientific research into smoking and health was implicating cigarettes in lung-cancer. Military service during WWII had also triggered a smoking epidemic in the population, and like asbestos, tobacco-induced lung-cancer and heart diseases had relatively long incubation periods. Both asbestos and smoking can independently cause lung-cancer, but together they are highly dangerous. In 1960 Selikoff was warning those working with asbestos and those previously exposed, not to smoke. He was mainly concerned with the millions of US shipyard workers who were exposed to asbestos lagging during the war. These scientific findings set the tobacco industry and the asbestos companies at loggerheads, with each trying to lay the blame on the other for the spate of environmentally-cause cancers.  Then in 1968 at the height of the initial cigarette-cancer scare, Selikoff wrote an article in a medical magazine pointing out that smoking asbestos workers had "92 times the risk" of dying from lung cancer as nonsmoking, non-asbestos workers. With a multiplier like this, it no longer made sense for one industry to blame the other; Selikoff's research was now seen as a primary threat to both industries. In a study for the US Labor Department, Selikoff's associate, Dr. William J. Nicholson, estimated that between 1940 and 1979, 18.8 million US workers had been significantly exposed to asbestos in their work. Nicholson concluded that this history of exposure would yield 432,000 excess cancer deaths in the following sixty years [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/aff19a00/pdf] since the major killer diseases associated with asbestos (asbestosis, mesothelioma and lung-cancer) had incubation periods of up to 40 years. Johns Manville had refused to help the medical investigators from Mt Sinai, and had funded and organised the Asbestos Information Association through Matt Swetonic to counter the growing scientific evidence and the associated environmental and health activism. This organization was directed by executives at Johns-Manville, but run by [[Hill & Knowlton]]. So by 1972 Hill & Knowlton was working for both of these industries. Matt Swetonic ran the asbestos industry projects (mainly through acting as spokesman and industry advisor through the Asbestos Information Association) and a number of operators (including [[Leonard Zahn]] a scientific lobbyist employed by H&K for the tobacco industry) worked through the [[Tobacco Industry Research Committee]] (later the [[Council for Tobacco Research]]). Both these organizations occupied office space in the Empire State Building in New York officeon a floor directly below H&K's offices, and they shared H&K staff.  Through H&K's intervention, there was a formal coming together of the asbestos and tobacco interests with an agreement to cooperate rather than apportion blame. This came at a time when Congress was considering asbestos compensation legislation; DDT had just been banned, and the tobacco industry was also under legislative threat, especially in its ability to advertise in the broadcast media and requirements to include health warnings.  In this letter from Leonard Zahn to John Mansville's Vice President, FJ Solon (ccd to Matt Swetonic) Zahn comments on a scientific report by Selikoff [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/utj4aa00/pdf] which could generate trouble on both the tobacco and asbestos fronts. Note that the document came from the tobacco industry files.  Not long after after, Solon made a public statement characterising Dr Selikoff as a "cruel showman", saying: "''To terrorize people who worked in shipyards 30 years ago, and now can't do a God-damned thing about it - that's something I couldn't square with my conscicnce.''" [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/axr4aa00/pdf] ===The Tobacco Years=== In the mid-1980s, the [[Business RoundTable]] organised a coalition of asbestos and tobacco, together with the [[Chemical Manufacturers Association]] and various energy trade associations to promote joint projects aimed at countering the growing environmental and health activism. In particular, they decided to cooperated in legal and legislative actions to restrict pentalties for successful product liability and worker's compensation suites.  In 1983 the Business Roundtable also had its [[Task Force on Product Liability]] headed by Robert Malott (the CEO and Chairman of pesticide/chemical manufacturer FMC Corp.), and the US Chambers of Commerce had created a similar new organization known as the [[National Business Council on Injury Compensation]], to develop a unified business position on toxic substances compensation issues. A biographical note Asbestos was obviously one of their top priorities, but they were also trying to counter attacks over dioxins, DDT, Agent Orange, tobacco and a 2002 article range of other harmful products.  Their sworn enemies were the 'plaintiff lawyers' who had combined in an association known as the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATRA). To counter their influence they formed the [[American Tort Reform Association]] [[http://www.prwatch.org/prwissues/1996Q3/cohen.html]] using the Philip Morris-funded [[APCO]] company for management. By 1995, Big Tobacco was providing $5.5 million in funding for ATRA, which was more than half ATRA's budget -- and similar amounts were being provided for interconnected tort-reform lobby groups like the [[Coalition for Civil Justice Reform]] [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fya78e00/pdf]/ Matt Swetonic at Hill & Knowlton also did work at this time for Dow Chemicals and helped coordinate the herbicide/pesticide subsection of the Chemical Manufacturer's Association.[http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/upw43d00/pdf] And during this period he was elevated to the position of Senior Vice President of H&K, acting primarily as a media strategist and training advisor to RJ Reynolds Tobacco on its litigation problems [Heartland Institutehttp://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ngw15d00/pdf]. He had the working title (for use in the media) of 'Health and Environment Advisor' and he helped Reynolds set up media advisory centers to counter adverse publicity in some of the early tobacco trials in different parts of the country. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/abv05d00/pdf] listed  One task assigned to him was to "review the current medical literature on [[ETS]] ([[Environmental Tobacco Smoke]] -- passive smoking) ... to determine if there is a possibility of generating a national debate on the validity of the health claims being made against ETS." [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kid03d00/pdf]. The main aim here was to counter smoking restrictions in the workplace and in public venues like restaurants.  ====Premier "cigarette"====He also assisted RJ Reynolds in the marketing and promotion of the ill-fated Premier smokeless cigarette (actually a nicotine delivery device). In the tobacco archives, the development of Premier is known (successively) as Project SPA and Project Q. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vdr84d00/pdf] and later (with a 1988 relaunch) as Project Y and Alpha. Part of his responsibilities was to organize tame scientist and science journalists to write favorable reviews and editorials on Premier as a 'safe cigarette' (since the company was prohibited from making this claim in public itself). He ghost-wrote articles himself to be planted on major newspapers as op-ed pieces under other names. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ijb44d00/pdf] [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jjb44d00/pdf].  Swetonic was also called upon to defend RJ Reynolds in a claim make in the [[Journal of the American Medical Association]] (JAMA) that the Premier cigarette could be used to smoke crack! [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fqr14d00/pdf] His defense plan included the suggestion that they "identify individuals or groups who are in opposition to the [[AMA]]" and "create a coalition" to attack the medical profession's organisation. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jfb03d00/pdf]. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/beh43d00/pdf] When the [[Environmental Protection Agency]] ([[EPA]]) began to investigate the health and environmental problem associated with passive smoking ([[ETS]]), he created a public-persuasion project focussed on the slogan "Back-door Prohibition" [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/txp14d00/pdf]. The idea was to claim that the EPA was trying to seize control of indoor air regulation standards using "perverted science". He successfully predicted that the EPA would eventually classify environmental smoke as a Class A Carcinogen [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kup14d00/pdf].  Reynold's Premier cigarette was essentially a tube with heated taste beads and nicotine, and it was, in fact a catastrophe. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/euz92d00/pdf]. By the mid 1980s the major media were well-conversant with smoking-and-health issues, but Swetonic worked very hard to persuade major media organisations (like the Reader's Digest) that the Premier was, in fact, a 'safer cigarette' ... without actually making the claim [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/icr84d00/pdf] since cigarette-health claims were banned by the FTC.  In government regulatory affairs cigarettes held a special privileged position because of the strength of the tobacco farming lobby. The tobacco-growing states usually held the balance of power in the Senate and House, and their lobbying stopped tobacco from being considered an addictive drug. It was excused from [[Food and Drug Administration]] ([[FDA]]) regulation on the grounds that it was an 'agricultural product'. However, the Premier tube-delivery system opened the industry to regulation; clearly this was a 'drug delivery system' more akin to a hypodermic needle than an apple or chocolate stick. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gfb03d00/pdf] Reynolds quickly abandoned Premier when the [[FDA]] began to make their 'drug delivery' argument to Congress. ====Coalition conflicts====In 1991 he was also working on coalition problem with the chemical manufacturers and their trade associations. The growth of workplace smoking bans in chemical companies raised tensions between the coalition partners[http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/aqx44d00/pdf]. This is probably why he shifted from the main H&K office to [[E. Bruce Harrison]]. In the late 1980s and early 1990s The PR companies working for the tobacco and chemical industries were more collaborators than competitors. EBH had been successively taken over by the Pinnacle Group, then by Ruder Finn, and these companies all had close and cosy deals with Hill & Knowlton (which, itself, had been taken over a former Executive couple of times).  Swetonic retained the RJ Reynolds Tobacco account at EBH, and was officially given the title '''Senior Vice President and Director of Environmental Operations''' . [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kra71d00/pdf] He now began running operations on behalf of the tobacco industry as a whole, while remaining under RJ Reynolds control. [[Du Pont]], one of the major makers of herbicides and pesticides, had implemented a smoking ban in its own workplaces, and in this document Swetonic is using his contacts with the chemical industry to have this smoking ban reversed. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eqa24d00/pdf] He raises the possibility of having tobacco farmers boycott Du Pont's agricultural products, and since Du Pont also owned the Remington Arms Company, he suggests the possibility of having the [[National Rifle Association]] (NRA) put pressure on the chemical company to reverse the smoking ban. The Asbestos Information NRA and the tobacco industry worked closely together on problems of product liability, and they were both highly active in their support for the Republican Party's policies of unregulated free-enterprise and small government. In the following years Swetonic continued working with the tobacco industry, persuading tame scientists like Prof. [[Alvan Feinstein]] of Yale to write articles dismissing the regulatory science and supporting the tobacco industry's position [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vhj61c00/pdf]. He also continued his campaign against the AMA [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tyg23d00/pdf]. ====Total Indoor Environment Quality (TIEQ)====At EBH, Swetonic was instrumental in creating a front association in mid-1991 which was known as the [[Total Indoor Environment Quality]] association (TIEQ). This was nominally a coalition under the [[National Environmental Development Association ]] (NEDA) which was, itself, created by EBH in 1973 with the intention of North Americarunning seminars for business leaders on environmental, and specifically with Indoor Air Quality (IAQ) in the workplace. AT that time the tobacco industry was promoting the idea of the '''Sick Building Syndrome''' as the cause of health and general well-being problems in offices and factories ... as an alternative to tobacco smoke! The TIEQ was a nation-wide front operation, nominally based in Washington (actually in New York), which proclaimed itself to be an "organization of environmental experts and concerned companies committed to finding solutions to the challenges associated with indoor air quality (IAQ)." [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wrx45d00/pdf]. The chairman of the scientific advisory board, Dr Ronald Gots, said that the TIEQ's chief mission was to "try to ensure that good science drives whatever policies are developed to regulate indoor air, that we have good science information as much as possible before we decide about controlling things." [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/okx83e00/pdf] The press release announcing the TIEQ's founding, claims that "the correlation between poor indoor environmental quality and adverse health effects hasn't been proven". These words come straight out of the tobacco industry's phrase book. RJ Reynolds provided the initial funds to establish the TIEQ, but the day-to-day operation were shared across the tobacco industry trade group dealing [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vsv61d00/pdf] with Philip Morris coming on board later [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ydk98e00/pdf]. The coalition also included fibre makers, synthetic carpet manufacturers, office-equipment manufacturers, and airlines -- all of which had indoor air quality problems; they had paid a nominal fee to belong to the policy-steering committee. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/htx61d00/pdf].  The tobacco industry generally preferred to hide behind their coalition partners in these matters. The Manville Corporation (the successor to [[Johns-Manville]]) was also a charter member, [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wrx45d00/pdf] and the actual TIEQ offices were in the same building as E Bruce Harrison Co. Matt Swetonic is listed by them as "TIEQ Staff". ====Product liability==== Swetonic also worked for tobacco and the chemical industry with with asbestos health the Manhattan Institute (specifically Peter Huber and Walter Olson) [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hjn24e00/pdf] [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pil98e00/pdf] [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ajn43c00/pdf]. This think-tank was funded by tobacco and other TIEQ-member industries to circulate dubious and exaggerated product-liability stories (''e.g. A woman got $3 m for spilling hot coffee, etc.'') and regulatory issuesto promote the idea that run-away product liability claims were destroying the US economy. The aim of these activities was to change public perception in support of "tort reform" [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/unn97d00/pdf] [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jub77a00/pdf] by exaggerating the costs associated with legal damages claims, and to try to block class actions and punitive damages. Swetonic, at this time, was on a temporary retainer from Philip Morris (Tom Borelli) [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mbw87d00/pdf]. These Manhattan Institute and ATRA activities were also supported by [[Michael Fumento]] (a pro-industry health-journalist for hire) and junk-man [[Steve Milloy]] of [[TASSC]] (who ran one of the main science lobby group for the tobacco industry - and now runs http://www.heartlandjunkscience.com). (Steve Redhead was a Congressional Research Section (CRS) employee who was involved in a pro-tobacco research report for the tobacco industry (note the suggestion that the CRS report was being rewritten with Milloy's help)). ===The Dilenschneider Group===Swetonic shifted over to work for the Dilenschneider Group in 1996; he was made a partner. Bob (RL) Dilenschneider had been his superior at Hill & Knowlton in the early days. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/icw87d00/pdf] The TIEQ was still operating as a lobby force on indoor air in August 1999. [http://legacy.library.ucsf.orgedu/tid/zuz95c00/pdf] and it appears to have been listed as a tobacco ally by Philip Morris in Dec 1997 [http://Articlelegacy.library.ucsf.cfm?artId=10701edu/tid/bej62c00/pdf]and included in RJ Reynold's official Lobbying Report in 2000 - both well after the Master Settlement Agreement.