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With great portentous moment for the future, US Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy Seth Cropsy expressed his hope that the outcome of American operations in the Gulf would dispel the "national reluctance to interpose American military forces in third world conflicts when important issues are at stake." Those opposed to the tragedy and horror of US interventionism in the region today certainly do not share in this hope.
''The Saddam Hussein Question
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While the Western media has consistently and successfully portrayed Saddam Hussein as a thug and a ruthless mad dictator, the fact is that Saddam Hussien worked closely with the US Central Intelligence Agency for more than thirty years, from the 1960's and continuing on to the brink of his invasion of Kuwait and subsequent parting of the ways in 1990. It is no coincidence that this parting of the ways occurred in conjunction with the eclipse of Soviet power in the region in 1990.
After 1988 Hussein correctly recognized that the ascendance of one global super-power in the region [in the form of the United States] would seriously unbalance imbalance the uneasy status quo maintained in the region since the dawn of the cold war.
Hussein perceptively developed the world view that only one counterbalance to US authority could be developed in the region, namely strong Arab unity and economic cooperation, cooperation which was not forthcoming from Kuwait due to the festering contested border dispute. Hussein believed he could assert his authority and unite the majority of militant Arab opinion behind Iraq by invading Kuwait while the US promised to stand idly by.
Unfortunately Hussein was no Saladin, and he failed to unite the Arab world with his invasion while totally mis-reading the US response which now smelled like more of a trap. Hussein had committed the dictator's ultimate sin, namely isolating his cause and his military by failing to follow through on the assets one asset he was most in need of: loyal regional allies.
Hussein was a repugnant leader indeed, but more of a maverick than a madman; and history may ultimately view his role in an international shell game to be that of a pan-Arab fall guy as well as the traditional megalomaniac view.
