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| − | '''Preemptive war''' has been defined as a "military action undertaken absent an imminent threat or ongoing attack by an aggressor ... a decision to go to war without clear and convincing evidence of the need for us to defend ourselves against an imminent attack."[http://www.natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/020703/020703d.htm] | + | [[Category:Nuclear PR]] |
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| + | '''Preemptive war''' is a unilateral "first strike", in the face of an imminent armed threat. This type of war may be sanctioned under international law, but requires the nature of the threat to be credible and significant. |
| − | '''Quotes'''
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| − | *"There are basically two approaches to solving the problem of terrorism. One is that you understand the mind of the terrorist in order to establish defenses against it. The other is that you kill all the terrorists and all the potential terrorists." -- [[Jude Wanniski]] in a [http://www.wanniski.com/showarticle.asp?articleid=1634 memo] to [[Henry Kissinger]] regarding [[Richard Perle]] ("The Prince of Darkness"), September 18, 2001.
| + | ==Definition== |
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| + | ===''Wikipedia'' Definition=== |
| − | In January 2004, the matter of '''preemptive war''' initiated by the [[Bush administration]] in pursuit of alleged [[terrorist]]s, [[weapons of mass destruction]], [[al Qaeda]], [[Osama bin Laden]], and [[Saddam Hussein]] was pushed into public discourse for [[U.S. presidential election, 2004]] by [[George W. Bush]]'s former Secretary of the Treasury [[Paul O'Neill]], the main source for the upcoming book ''The Price of Loyalty'' by [[Ron Suskind]], a former [[Wall Street]] reporter.[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/09/60minutes/main592330.shtml?cmp=EM8707]
| + | "A preemptive attack (or preemptive war) is waged in an attempt to repel or defeat an imminent offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (usually unavoidable) war. |
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| − | According to O'Neill, from the moment of the "very first [[National Security Council]] (NSC) meeting, ... 'From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go,' says O'Neill, who adds that going after Saddam was topic '''A''' 10 days after the inauguration - eight months" prior to [[September 11, 2001]]. "'From the very first instance, it was about [[Iraq]]." The focus was on what could be done to affect [[regime change]], says Suskind, "'Day one, these things were laid and sealed.'"
| + | "Preemptive war is often confused with the term [[preventive war]]. While the latter is generally considered to violate international law, and to fall short of the requirements of a [[just war doctrine|just war]], preemptive wars are more often argued to be justified or justifiable. |
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| − | Suskind adds that O'Neill "got briefing materials" under his cover sheet for the second NSC meeting. "There are memos. One of them marked, secret, says, 'Plan for post-Saddam Iraq'." According to Suskind, "they discussed an [[occupation of Iraq]] in January and February of 2001." And, as early as March 2001, the Bush adminstration was discussing the future of [[Iraq's oil industry]], including "a map of potential areas for [oil] exploration."
| + | "The intention with a preemptive strike is to gain the advantage of initiative and to harm the enemy at a moment of minimal protection," particularly when the enemy is vulnerable. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preemptive_war] |
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| − | "Described as "preventive defense" or "extended deterrence" by its supporters--but decried as "a new form of gunboat diplomacy" by its detractors--a new program called the "[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm Counterproliferation Initiative]" [Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC 18]
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| − | was unveiled in December 1993 by then-Defense Secretary [[Les Aspin]].
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| − | "There was considerable controversy over what "counterproliferation" meant. But it was widely interpreted as indicating that the United States--having recently demonstrated overwhelming military superiority in the Gulf War--would now flex its muscles even further, looking into the ways and means of preemptively striking regional troublemakers or would-be attackers. | + | ===Daniel Webster=== |
| | + | In 1841, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster "articulated a set of demanding criteria for acting with a 'necessity of self-defense'—in particular for a legitimate use of preemptive force. Preemption, Webster said, is justified only in response to an imminent threat; moreover, the force must be necessary for self-defense and can be deployed only after nonlethal measures and attempts to dissuade the adversary from acting had failed. Furthermore, a preemptive attack must be limited to dealing with the immediate threat and must discriminate between armed and unarmed, innocent and guilty." [http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.1/crawford.html] |
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| − | "Although there was talk of building conventional weapons capable of destroying deeply buried targets like command centers (Aspin said both new strategies and new military capabilities were needed), the initiative envisioned the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defeat chemical or biological weapons. The idea, simply, was to "locate, neutralize, or destroy" others' [[weapons of mass destruction]] before they could be used. For the first time, the United States openly added targets in the Third World to its nuclear-weapons targeting plan. | + | ===International Court of Justice=== |
| | + | "The [[International Court of Justice]] (ICJ) spelled out exactly what no nation can legally do in light of its commitments to uphold the [[United Nations|U.N.]] Charter: 'Thus it would be illegal for a state to threaten force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it to follow or not follow certain political or economic paths'," according to Ann Fagan Ginger, Executive Director of the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute. [http://www.mcli.org/law/federal/war_is_preventive.html] |
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| − | "Now [April 2001], after eight years of reality, the initiative has morphed into something much less than promised. Author Henry Sokolski describes the process. | + | ===Anticipatory Self-Defense=== |
| | + | "The prevailing view probably is that, one way or another, anticipatory self-defense is permissible but traditionally has required the existence of an imminent threat," writes Steven C. Walsh, research analyst at the [[Center for Defense Information]]. [http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm] |
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| − | "The Fate of President [[Bill Clinton]]'s "Counterproliferation Initiative" was tethered to its strategic assumptions. '''An initial interest in devising plans for preemptive strikes against foreign proliferation activities simply ignored the American culture's bias against launching Pearl Harbor-like attacks. More important, the initiative at first presumed that some military-technical means could neutralize proliferation problems. And that, in fact, turned out to be inherently difficult, if not impossible.'''"
| + | ==[[Justifications for the US-Iraq 2003 war: "preemption" or "preemptive war"]]== |
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| − | [http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01sokolski.html Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists], March/April 2001.
| + | ==Quotes== |
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| + | Preemptive war "punishes the defenseless not for what they have done or are doing but for what they might have done or could do."<br>—[http://www.paxhumana.info/article.php3?id_article=280 Eduardo Galeano, PaxHumana, September 2003]. |
| − | '''Where It All Began: Origination for the Concept of a "Preemptive War"'''
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| − | Khurram Husain, in his article [http://jahrbuch2003.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Weltmacht/American_Dreams/american_dreams.html American Dreams. Intellectual Roots of Neo-conservative Thinking] published in the 2003 Yearbook "Studien Von Zeitfragen", writes:
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| − | "If [[Albert Wohlstetter]] was a moralist at heart because he believed that power had a higher purpose, [[Andrew Marshall]], his contemporary and peer in the [[RAND Corporation]], who also joined in 1949, is a purist. For Marshall there are no lessons to draw from Vietnam except military lessons, and power is its own justification.
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| − | "For 23 years, Marshall worked with the RAND Corporation but has left virtually no paper trail behind. All we know of him is what we are told by those who have known him. He is known as a man of few words, rarely ever speaking before large gatherings, meticulously avoids leaving behind a record, and has been described as "delphic" in his manner of speech sometimes. And yet his may be the single most enduring legacy of any from amongst his peers.
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| − | "There is very little to tell us about Marshall's work at RAND since hardly any of it has been declassified. In 1972, his friend and fellow RAND researcher, [[James R. Schlesinger]] who was serving as Secretary of Defense in the [[Nixon administration]], created a little office in the [[Department of Defense]] titled the [[Office of Net Assessment]] (ONA), and made Marshall the Director. The ONA had a murky brief. Marshall's job was to imagine every kind of threat the US military might ever face. Marshall used the ONA to assist the Team B in their efforts to access raw intelligence. He followed Soviet military thinking closely, ran war game exercises involving novel scenarios, and taught a summer seminar at the [[Naval War College]]. For 30 years Marshall has directed the ONA, and built for himself a formidable reputation and an equally formidable network of protégés in and out of government.
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| − | "In the 1970s, Marshall busied himself with concepts of ballistic missile defense and closely reading Soviet literature on nuclear war. This is where he came across the writings of the Soviet general staff on the nature of military revolutions. The Soviet officers were arguing that advances in missile, communication and sensor technologies were creating the conditions for a "military technical revolution" somewhat akin to how artillery had rendered horse mounted cavalry obsolete.
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| − | "Marshall was impressed, and followed this idea of military revolutions closely. He found that the period in the 1920s and 30s was the most dynamic period in military revolutions, seeing new technologies like aircraft, but also new operational concepts in supply and maneouver such as blitzkrieg. He became an advocate of just such a revolution, but added that it was not exclusively technology driven, but opertationally driven as well.
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| − | "He called his ideas the "[[revolution in military affairs]]" (RMA). Failing to make much headway with top level decision makers in replacing containment and deterrence thinking with RMA, he turned his attention to the officer corps of the Pentagon. He ran annual exercises, war games and seminars and stimulated his students at the Naval War College to think about warfare in entirely new terms.
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| − | "He attracted quite a following. [[Barry Watts]], an air force pilot and graduate of the airforce academy, took his ideas to [[Northrop Grumman]] Corporation and as director of their Analysis Center, persuaded the company to look away from large fighter platforms and towards high tech avionics for its future. Grumman was the first company bring the ideas of the RMA on board.
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| − | "Lt Gen. [[Andrew F. Krepinevich]] of the Marine Corps was another protégé, who was immensely impressed with Marshall's novel thinking on the role of information in warfare, and authored a book with [[Zalmay Khalilzad]], an oil company consultant and current Bush envoy to Afghanistan and Iran, on the subject.
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| − | "His best known protégé is probably [[Donald Rumsfeld]], whose association with Marshall is decades old, dating from Rumsfeld's early days in the Pentagon. Rumseld became an early proponent of ballistic missile defense, a Marshall idea and belonged to that clique of hawkish policy makers who were opposed to [[Henry Kissinger]]'s ideas of détente and engagement with China.
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| − | "Following the collapse of the USSR, Marshall had a brief period when he argued that the USSR was now at its most dangerous moment since they might lash out at one last chance to militarily hold their empire together. In the early 90s, Marshall became a China hawk, arguing that Chinese growth rates had made it possible for China to become a nuclear competitor of the US within 25 years. In 1993 the ONA funded a series of roundtable discussions amongst all the services to discuss the military impact of advances in information technology, the value of space warfare, joint operational commands and greater coordination amongst the services, and the impact of declining budgets on the RMA.
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| − | "By 1994, Marshall's twenty year long efforts to convert the Pentagon officer corps were beginning to bear fruit. Deputy Secretary of Defense [[William J. Perry]] started a project to conduct a department wide discussion on the RMA. The project looked at future defense needs till 2015 and recommended the most promising technologies and operational concepts, conducted war games to simulate these defense environments and produced a report on their findings.
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| − | "When the [[Bush administration]] came to power, the RMA was put into practice. Rumsfeld was made the Secretary of Defense, and began by appointing Barry Watts to the Program Evaluation and Assessment Office, [[James G. Roche]] as the Secretary of the Air Force, and empowered Andrew Marshall to conduct a sweeping review of the military and make recommendations to make the military into a 21st century fighting force. The RMA was no longer part of the lunatic fringe from where it had originated. Its adherents were now in control, and were going to make their presence felt.
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| − | "The outcome was the [[Quadrennial Defense Review]] of 2002. The review called for reshaping the armed forces to make them lighter, faster, more flexible and able to conduct multi theater operations simultaneously. It met fierce resistance from the old guard of the services, who were wedded to the status quo and feared seeing their pet fighter wings, aircraft carrier battle groups and armored divisions get scrapped. But Marshall and his ilk have a history of an almost cult like confidence in their mission, and a determination to succeed that is best seen in their 30 year long effort that has only now come to its moment of truth.
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| − | "The ideas of Marshall and Wohlstetter drive the foreign policy of the Bush administration. The doctrine of pre-emptive action only takes Wohlstetter's logic behind the second strike capability to its logical conclusion in a world where those who possess [[weapons of mass destruction]] may not be as easily deterred as the USSR was. And the [[war on terrorism]] has provided that environment of perpetual uncertainty in war that Marshall and his protégés have been thinking about for decades. As the superpower girds itself for a ruinous war in an uncertain part of the world, one is reminded of the hubris of power and the follies that led America into the Vietnam war. Today America is being steered into an endless war precisely by those who have been preparing for this sort of world all their lives. We shall soon see whether they know what they are doing."
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| − | In a second article, [http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/nd03/nd03husain.html "Neocons: The men behind the curtain"] published November/December 2003 in the ''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'', Khurram Husain writes:
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| − | "By the [[George Herbert Walker Bush]] administration, [[Paul D. Wolfowitz]] was working for [[Dick Cheney]], the secretary of defense. In May 1990 he delivered a briefing for Cheney recommending that the United States take steps to ensure its strategic dominance for the foreseeable future. As director of the Pentagon's [[Defense Planning Board]], he was tasked with writing the next [[Defense Planning Guidance]], recommending where U.S. military priorities ought to be in the post-Cold War world.
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| − | "'''What Wolfowitz produced in that document was nothing less than a blueprint for world domination.''' He recognized that with the Soviet collapse, no country on earth had the capability to wage large-scale conventional war against America. But that did not mean the end of threats to American power. Instead, he argued, the United States must 'maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.'"
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| − | "In short, strategic decisions had to be made before the threat materialized. During the Cold War, Wohlstetter had strenuously argued for preventive deployment as the posture necessary to maintain the deterrent against a growing communist threat. Wolfowitz, his protégé, in the waning days of the Cold War, argued for preemptive action as the only way to assure order in a world in which it could no longer be assumed that nuclear-armed belligerents would behave rationally."
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| − | "The war plan in Iraq was built on these concepts. Inspired by the Nazi invasion of France, Rumsfeld's war plan had three armored columns advance rapidly on Baghdad in one large maneuver. The idea was to head for the center as fast as possible and end the conflict by decapitating the enemy. The flexibility of the plan showed itself when the Fourth Infantry Division, which was supposed to move south from Turkey to Baghdad, was denied permission to operate out of Turkey--and the war moved ahead nonetheless. Speed was the other critical factor, and when intense resistance in the south, particularly at Nasiriyah, threatened to slow the pace of the advance, the units were ordered to continue northward rather than perpetuate the fight.
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| − | "The plan worked spectacularly, although the Iraqi army put up a much fiercer fight than the planners had imagined. Its shortcomings became apparent only in the aftermath of the war. Hundreds of thousands of militarily trained Iraqi army personnel were released into the general population. This left the occupying power with no means to control their actions, the consequences of which are now apparent.
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| − | "Why was the war necessary in the first place? In the eyes of those who pressed for war, the United States was already in a quagmire following the indeterminate outcome of the first Gulf War. According to Wolfowitz, leaving [[Saddam Hussein]] in power was a big mistake. The way he saw it, there was no way to readmit Iraq under Saddam Hussein back into the community of nations, because it would then be impossible to suppress his ambitions to acquire [[weapons of mass destruction]]. Given the zero margin of error that weapons of mass destruction allow, and the strategic significance of the Middle East, such an ambition could not be tolerated. The sanctions, for their part, could not be maintained indefinitely, either. The status quo was the quagmire, and [[regime change]] was the only way out. And the sooner it was carried out, the lower the cost of the operation and rebuilding would be.
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| − | "The quest for an impregnable defense and military supremacy over the rest of the world has brought America to a perilous moment of truth. The war in Iraq is located where Wohlstetter and Wolfowitz's ideas of strategic supremacy intersect with the impregnable force that Marshall and Rumsfeld wish to build. The application of counterforce ideas to a [[guerrilla war]] pulled the United States into a colossal quagmire in Vietnam. But the doctrine of preemptive action turns the iron law of necessity in nuclear strategy into foreign policy. This time the quagmire will not be an unwinnable war in one country, but endless war across a vast stretch of the Earth---a war from which extrication will be next to impossible."
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| − | '''More "Justification" for the Preemptive War in Iraq'''
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| − | *[http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=540&u=/ap/20040126/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ashcroft_iraq_1&printer=1 27 January 2004]: "Ashcroft: War Justified Even Without WMD" by William J. Kole, AP: "Even if weapons of mass destruction are never found in Iraq, the U.S.-led war was justified because it eliminated the threat that Saddam Hussein might again resort to '''[[evil]] chemistry and evil biology,''' Attorney General [[John Ashcroft]] said Monday."
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| − | '''Quotable Quotes'''
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| − | Preemptive war "punishes the defenseless not for what they have done or are doing but for what they might have done or could do." | |
| − | -- [http://www.paxhumana.info/article.php3?id_article=280 Eduardo Galeano, PaxHumana, September 2003].
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| − | -----
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| − | == Other Related SourceWatch Resources ==
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| | + | == Related SourceWatch Resources == |
| | + | *[[Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002]] |
| | *[[Bush doctrine]] | | *[[Bush doctrine]] |
| − | *[[civil liberties]] | + | *[[Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations]] |
| − | *[[clear and present danger]]
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| − | *[[Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996]]
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| − | *[[Defense Science Board]]
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| | *[[Eisenhower doctrine]] | | *[[Eisenhower doctrine]] |
| − | *"[[forward strategy of freedom]]" | + | *[[Geneva Conventions]] |
| − | *[[Homeland defense]] | + | *[[nuclear weapons]] |
| − | *[[Homeland security]] | + | *[[PDD-39]] |
| − | *[[Iraq Coalition Casualty Statistics]]
| + | *[[PDD-62]] |
| − | *[[Iraqi Civil Defense Corps]]
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| − | *[[National Security State]]
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| − | *[[National Security Strategy of September 2002]]
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| − | *[[National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction]]
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| − | *[[NSC-68]]
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| − | *[[neoconservative]]
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| − | *[[Operation Iraqi Freedom]]
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| − | *[[Operation Iraqi Freedom II]]
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| − | *[[Patriot Act I]]
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| − | *[[peacekeeping]]
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| − | *[[Post-war Iraq/NATO]] | |
| − | *[[Proactive Preemptive Operations Group]]
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| − | *[[Project for the New American Century]]
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| − | *[[regime change]]
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| − | *[[Roberta Wohlstetter]]
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| − | *[[Stanley Foundation's Independent Task Force on US Strategies for National Security]]
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| − | *[[Transitional Iraqi Government]]
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| | *[[Truman doctrine]] | | *[[Truman doctrine]] |
| − | *[[U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century / Hart-Rudman Commission]]
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| − | *[[war on freedom]]
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| − | *[[war on terrorism]]
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| − | *[[weapons of mass destruction]]
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| − | == External Links ==
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| − | '''Preemptive War Against Iraq'''
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| − | *Paul W. Schroeder, [http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html Iraq: The Case Against Preemptive War. The administration's claim of a right to overthrow regimes it considers hostile is extraordinary - and one the world will soon find intolerable], ''The American Conservative'', no date.
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| − | *Alan Bock, [http://www.antiwar.com/bock/b091002.html Preventive or Preemptive War?], ''Eye on the Empire'', September 10, 2002.
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| − | *William Galston, [http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/17/galston-w.html Perils of Preemptive War. Why America's place in the world will shift -- for the worse -- if we attack Iraq], ''The American Prospect'', September 23, 2002.
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| − | *Stephen Murdock, [http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/january_2003/war.cfm Preemptive War: Is It Legal?], ''DCBar'', January 2003.
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| − | *Todd Gitlin, [http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2003/02/ma_205_01.html America's Age of Empire: The Bush Doctrine], ''MotherJones'', January/February 2003.
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| − | *Michael E. Salla, [http://www.exopolitics.org/Study-Paper2.htm An Exopolitical Perspective on the Preemptive War against Iraq], ''Exopolitics'', February 3, 2003.
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| − | *Eliot Katz, [http://www.counterpunch.org/katz02282003.html To Declare Pre-emptive War is to Declare a Bankruptcy of the Imagination], ''CounterPunch'', February 28, 2003.
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| − | *Robert Schneer, [http://www.salon.com/opinion/scheer/2003/03/12/war_crimes/index_np.html Preemptive war crimes. Driven by a coterie of neoconservative ideologues -- and the accidental president in their sway -- we are hours away from becoming international outlaws], ''Salon.com'', March 12, 2003.
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| − | *Jeffrey Donovan,[http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/03/14032003174825.asp Iraq: 'Preemptive' Or Otherwise, U.S. Interventionism Has A Long History], ''Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty'', March 14, 2003.
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| − | *Steven R. Weisman, [http://www.iht.com/articles/90747.html Doctrine of preemptive war has its roots in early 1990s], ''International Herald Tribune'', March 24, 2003.
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| − | *Bob Zimmerman, [http://www.impeach-bush-now.org/Articles/CampaignMore/globalnightmare.htm The truth behind the American invasion of Iraq: The Bush administration's evolving global nightmare], ''impeach-bush-now.org'', April 7, 2003: "When did 'democracy' become an American export; a commodity installed wherever we see fit by means of overwhelming force?"
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| − | *[[Howard Dean]], [http://www.deanvolunteers.org/DeanVolunteers/press_view.asp?ID=740 Bush: It's Not Just His Doctrine That's Wrong], ''CommonDreams'', April 17, 2003.
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| − | *Joel S. Beinin, Ivan Eland, and Edward A. Olsen, [http://www.independent.org/tii/forums/030625ipfTrans.html Preemptive War Strategy: A New U.S. Empire?] (Transcript), [[The Independent Institute]], June 25, 2003.
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| − | *Ulrich Arnswald, [http://www.indybay.org/news/2003/09/1639819.php Preventive War or Preemptive War], ''IndyMedia'', September 3, 2003.
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| − | *Stan Crock, [http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=66&ncid=66&e=1&u=/bw/20031022/bs_bw/nf200310221599db056 Preemptive War Is the Wrong Weapon], ''BusinessWeek'' Online, October 22, 2003: "the electronic newsletter sent out by [[Chuck Spinney]], a retired Pentagon analyst ... starts out with a quote from the late journalist [[H. L. Mencken]]: '''"The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed [and hence clamorous to be led to safety] by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary."'''
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| − | *Jalal Ghazi, [http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=17268 Wolfowitz Doctrine Sinks in the Iraqi Quagmire], Pacific News Service, November 25, 2003: "The pre-emption doctrine of Deputy Defense Secretary [[Paul Dundes Wolfowitz]] helped fuel the war in Iraq. Wolfowitz argued that the United States should 'shape,' not just react, to the world, acting alone when necessary and using its military and economic hegemony to foster American values and protect U.S. interests. But the outcome of the Iraq war has brought about the opposite: the quagmire has stymied aggressive U.S. unilateral action and forced Washington to work with European allies and even an old foe, Iran."
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| − | '''Future Preemptive Actions''' | + | == External links == |
| | + | *Paul W. Schroeder, [http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html "Iraq: The Case Against Preemptive War. The administration’s claim of a right to overthrow regimes it considers hostile is extraordinary – and one the world will soon find intolerable,"] ''American Conservative Magazine'', undated. |
| | + | *Netta C. Crawford, [http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.1/crawford.html "The Best Defense. The problem with Bush’s 'preemptive' war doctrine,"] ''Boston Review'', February/March 2003. |
| | + | *Dietrich Murswiek, [http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/institute/ioeffr3/forschung/papers/murswiek/PreemptiveWar.pdf "The American Strategy of Preemptive War and International Law,"] Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiberg Institute of Public Law, March 2003. |
| | + | *Ann Fagan Ginger, [http://www.mcli.org/law/federal/war_is_preventive.html "Preemptive War / Preventive War. Both Are Against The Law Of The United States,"] Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, undated [2004]. |
| | + | *Steven Murdoch, [http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/january_2003/war.cfm "Preemptive War: Is It Legal?,"] ''DCBar.org'', January 2003. |
| | + | *[http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20030415_segal.html "Pre-Crime? What the Film Minority Report Can Teach Us About the Three Key Rules of Preemptive War,"] ''FindLaw's Writ'', April 15, 2003. |
| | + | *Russell Madden, [http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?p=%22preemptive+war%22&ei=UTF-8&fl=0&pstart=1&b=91&u=freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/selfdefense_preempt.htm&w=%22preemptive+war%22&d=12914A2F40&icp=1&.intl=us "Self-Defense: Preemptive, Immediate, and Retaliatory"] (cache file), ''The Laissez Faire Electronic Times'', Vol 2, No 18, May 5, 2003. |
| | + | *Duncan E.J. Currie, [http://www.globelaw.com/Iraq/Preventive_war_after_iraq.htm "'Preventive War' and International Law After Iraq,"] May 22, 2003. |
| | + | *Steven C. Welsh, [http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm "Preemptive War and International Law,"] Center for Defense Information, December 5, 2003. |
| | + | *Maggie Ledford Lawson,[http://www.natcath.com/NCR_Online/archives2/2004a/022704/022704p.php "The fatal legend of preemptive war. German history shows the perils of Washington's new strategy,"] ''National Catholic Reporter'', February 27, 2004. |
| | + | *John Hendren, [http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2005/0319firststrike.htm "Policy OKs First Strike to Protect US,"] ''Los Angeles Times'', March 19, 2005: "Two years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon has formally included in key strategic plans provisions for launching preemptive strikes against nations thought to pose a threat to the United States. The doctrine also now stipulates that the U.S. will use 'active deterrence' in concert with its allies 'if we can' but could act unilaterally otherwise, Defense officials said." |
| | | | |
| − | *David Morgan, [http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=578&ncid=578&e=14&u=/nm/20031205/ts_nm/iraq_usa_stabilization_dc Pentagon Weighs Contentious Peacekeeping Plans], Reuters, December 5, 2003.
| + | [[category:national security]] |
| − | *[http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0128-06.htm US Plans Spring Offensive in Pakistan], Reuters, January 28, 2004: "The U.S. military is making plans for an offensive that would reach inside Pakistan in coming months to try to destroy operations of [[Osama bin Laden]]'s [[al Qaeda]] network, the ''Chicago Tribune'' reported on Wednesday. ... The newspaper, in a report from Washington citing military sources, said the plans involved thousands of U.S. troops, some of them already in neighboring Afghanistan. ... The Pakistani government denied to Reuters that it would allow such an operation and the Pentagon declined to confirm that such a plan was being worked on."
| + | [[category:war in Iraq]][[category:Iraq]][[category:Globalization]] |
| | + | [[Category:Civil liberties (U.S.)]][[Category:Needs review]] |
