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| − | Profile: Rohan Gunaratna
| + | [[Image:RohanGunaratna.jpg|right|thumb|Rohan Gunaratna]]'''Rohan Gunaratna''' is a Singapore-based "terrorism expert" at The [[Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies]] (IDSS) where is currently an Associate Professor. Previously he was a research assistant at St. Andrews' University (Scotland)'s [[Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence]] (CSTPV) where he was listed as an "acknowledged expert on terrorism in South Asia". He is the "former principal investigator of the UN's Terrorism Prevention Branch, Gunaratna has been called the world's top expert on Al Qaeda". As a Sri Lankan, his area of expertise is in the Tamil Tigers, a militant Tamil separatist group. Of the publications listed at the CSTPV, Gunaratna has authored four - all of which relate specifically to Sri Lanka's Tamil insurrection. However, since September 11, he has been a prolific commentator on global terrorism and often appearing as a terrorologist pundit. He recently visited Australia, where he made a number of widely reported, ill-substantiated, and unchallenged, claims that there were several "child-killing terrorist groups" operating in Australia, hiding behind community and humanitarian fronts, whilst manipulating the Australian government through powerful lobbying of politicians. |
| − | Positions that Rohan Gunaratna has held:
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| − | Research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at University of St. Andrews in Scotland
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| − | Quotes
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| − | January 2003
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| − | “Al-Qaeda hates the Iraqi government for the way it treated the Kurds in northern Iraq after the Gulf War. There is no reason why it should be any different now. .. Iraq has been involved with Palestinian groups such as Hamas, but not with al-Qaeda.” [Scotsman, 1/30/2003]
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| − | Associated Events
| + | ==Career== |
| − | Events leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - July 2002-March 19, 2003 - Numerous US and Bri ...
| + | *2004-: Associate Professor, The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore. Where his Research Interests are listed as follows: Terrorist organisations; terrorist operational and support networks; maritime terrorist tactics, technologies and techniques; suicide terrorism; and terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. |
| − | Rohan Gunaratna participated in the following events as an activeparticipant:
| + | *1996-2003: Masters degree at Notre Dame University, went on to complete his doctorate at Scotland’s St. Andrews University, and was appointed research fellow at the university’s Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.{{ref|kelly}} |
| − | After October 2001Rohan Gunaratna, a research fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, begins researching for his book, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. He examines several tens of thousands of documents acquired from al-Qaeda and Taliban sources. During the course of his investigation, he finds no evidence of an Iraqi-al-Qaeda link. In an op-ed piece printed in the International Herald Tribune on February 19, 2003, he writes: “In addition to listening to 240 tapes taken from al-Qaeda’s central registry, I debriefed several al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees. I could find no evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The documentation and interviews indicated that al-Qaeda regarded Saddam, a secular leader, as an infidel.” [International Herald Tribune, 2/19/2003 Sources: Rohan Gunaratna]
| + | *1984-1994: Office of the Science Adviser to the Sri Lankan President; also doing research and consultancy work for the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development. |
| − | Entity Tags: Rohan Gunaratna
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| − | Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
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| − | July 2002-March 19, 2003Numerous US and British, current and former, intelligence, military, and other government officials who have inside knowledge refute claims made by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein’s regime has or is seeking ties with international militant Islamic groups. [Wall Street Journal, 8/15/2002; Washington Post, 9/10/2002; Baltimore Sun, 9/26/2002; Knight Ridder, 10/7/2002; Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 10/13/2002; Radio Free Europe, 10/29/2002; International Herald Tribune, 11/1/2002; CBC News, 11/1/2002; Los Angeles Times, 11/4/2002; New York Times, 2/3/2003; Daily Telegraph, 2/4/2003; Independent, 2/9/2003]
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| − | Entity Tags: Daniel Benjamin, Michael Chandler, Jean-Louis Bruguiére, Vincent Cannistraro, Michael O'Hanlon, Brent Scowcroft, Jack Straw, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, Richard Durbin, Baltasar Garzon, Rohan Gunaratna, Vincent Cannistraro, Youssef M. Ibrahim, Tony Blair, Igor Ivanov, Jean Chretien, Anna Eshoo
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| − | Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
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| − | (Show related quotes)
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| − | Rohan Gunaratna is a Sri Lankan researcher on terrorism. He is the head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He is a Senior Fellow at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies, Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy and an Honorary Fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism in Israel. He has served as a consultant to the United Kingdom and United States law enforcement communities.Gunaratna said in a telephone interview on 7 January 2006 that a terrorist attack in Bangkok, Thailand is "now just a matter of time. [Southern insurgents] have the capabilities, and their reach is increasing. They're increasingly able to operate outside the traditional territory of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. Bangkok must improve the quality of its intelligence. This insurgency is an intelligence war – it's not so much a military campaign. By increasing the military presence, the hostility of the Muslims will grow and the insurgency will gain more support."[1][http:cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity=rohan-gunaratna]
| + | ==Critical assessment== |
| | + | Amir Butler writes about Gunaratna:{{ref|butler2}} |
| | + | <blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Dr Rohan Gunaratna has emerged as the go-to guy for media outlets wanting to get an academic spin on terrorism. |
| | + | Feted as an expert on terror, he has traveled the world, speaking to governments, think tanks and appearing on television from the BBC to O'Reilly. CNN described him on August 19, 2002 as, "Rohan Gunaratna, an expert on al Qaeda who was called on to address Congress, the United Nations and the Australian Parliament following the September 11 attacks". He even recently appeared in the middle of the John Walker Lindh trial as an expert for the defence. He then went on a tour of the world's media making claims based on his private "interviews" with Lindh. Gunaratna's work was also used to smear the Islamic party in Malaysia (PAS) as being linked to the al-Qaeda organisation. Given this relatively high profile and status as an authority on Islamic terror, it is surprising to know that this man who was, until recently, listed as a Research Assistant from St Andrew's University in Scotland had never produced a single publication dealing with Arab or Muslim terrorism prior to September 11. On the contrary, Gunaratna's experience and prior work has been entirely in Sri Lankan separatism, particularly the Tamil Tigers.<br><b><big>…</big></b><br> On September 27, 2001, the Sydney Morning Herald reports Gunaratna's declaration that he had "evidence" of numerous terrorist groups active in Australia, including Hamas, and that Australia must establish an "anti-terrorist unit" to root them out. The article reports that, as has become characteristic, Gunaratna declines to mention his source or any evidence to support these accusations. Interestingly, Gunaratna warned that liberal laws are to blame - a theme that remains consistent in his Quixotic adventure. Despite Gunaratna's claims of compelling evidence, neither the Australian government nor its law enforcement apparatus, have admitted any such presence or taken steps to eradicate it. On the same day, the UK's Financial Times reported that Gunaratna had labeled Germany the base for al-Qaeda in Europe. Again, he blamed the "tight limits on how intelligence and police officials can gather evidence against suspects, a strong civil liberties tradition and easy access to education and welfare provision".<br><b><big>…</big></b><br>It is impossible to know whether Gunaratna is an exaggerator, a liar, absent minded, careless, or simply ignorant of the facts. The answer is, however, irrelevant. Regardless of the reason, these inconsistencies, lack of proof and outrageous, unsupported claims should make Gunaratna a completely incredulous source for information on terrorism. That Gunaratna has, till now, been able to peddle his tabloid-style sensationalism to an accepting and largely unquestioning audience is a sad indictment on some sections of the media and also a reflection of the blanket of hysteria that has covered much of society since September 11.</blockquote> |
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| − | Gunaratna, commenting on Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist organization that is banned throughout most of Asia as a terrorist organization, said "It actively promotes dismantling the state of Israel" and "attacking the United States."[2]
| + | ==Affiliations== |
| − | [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohan_Gunaratna] | + | *[[Asia-Pacific Foundation]] |
| | + | *Advisory Council, [[Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies Afghanistan]] <ref>[http://www.caps.af/advisory.asp Advisory Council], Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies Afghanistan, accessed December 12, 2010.</ref> |
| | + | *Editorial Board, [[Terrorism and Political Violence]] <ref>[http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/journal.asp?issn=0954-6553&linktype=145 Editorial Board], Terrorism and Political Violence, accessed January 13, 2011.</ref> |
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| | + | ==Publications by Gunaratna== |
| | + | *Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Columbia Univ. Press, 2002. |
| | + | *Rohan Gunaratna, [http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-06gunaratna-speech.html Speech about Al Qaeda], Commonwealth Club, 25 June 2002. |
| | + | *Rohan Gunaratna,[http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-gunaratna.htm Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States], 9 July 2003. |
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| − | New Book Bulletins
| + | ==External Resources== |
| − | Inside Al Qaeda
| + | *Amir Butler, [http://forums.muslimvillage.net/index.php?showtopic=58 Who Is Rohan Gunaratna - The Self Proclaimed Al-Qaeda Expert?], www.amirbutler.com |
| − | Global Network of Terror
| + | *{{note|butler2}}Amir Butler, "Taking on a Terrorist", 15 Oct 2002. (restricted link, but available via Google cache). |
| | + | *{{note|kelly}}Rick Kelly [http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/aug2003/guna-a08.shtml The Australian media and terrorism "expert" Dr Rohan Gunaratna], WSWS, 8 August 2003. |
| | + | *Laurie Oakes, [http://sunday.ninemsn.com.au/sunday/political_transcripts/article_1882.asp Interview with Rohan Gunaratna], NineMSN, 2 Oct 2005. |
| | + | *Daniel Hoare, [http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2005/s1469369.htm Gareth Evans downplays terrorist risk in Australia], ABC-Australia, 27 Sept 2005. |
| | + | *''SBS Dateline'', [http://203.15.102.143:8080/ramgen/media/dl_170304c.rm Rohan Gunaratna and Tariq Ali], 17 March 2003. |
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| − | Rohan Gunaratna
| + | ==Contact== |
| | + | :Phone: 6790 4491 (Singapore) |
| | + | :E-Mail: isrkgunaratna@ntu.edu.sg |
| | + | :Web Site: [http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/about_idss/staff_profile_research.html www.ntu.edu.sg] |
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| | + | ==Resources and articles== |
| | + | ===Related Sourcewatch=== |
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| − | "Excellent....Gunaratna has taken a great deal of information from around the world--marshalling together police and intelligence sources, his own interviews with al Qaeda associates and the group's own documents--to create a comprehensive examination of the terrorist network."
| + | ===References=== |
| − | —Peter Bergen, Washington Post
| + | <references/> |
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| − | "[This] book is a careful and methodical account of bin Laden's emergence as a leader, and of al-Qaeda cells active around the world. As a handbook, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror does the work of many tomes, but its chief strength is to be found in Gunaratna's final chapter, where he argues that the political war will be ignored at America's peril."
| + | [[Category:Terrorism analysts]] |
| − | —Thomas Powers, New York Review of Books
| + | [[Category:Civil liberties (U.S.)]][[Category:Needs review]] |
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| − | "An essential first step in good counterintelligence work."
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| − | —Foreign Affairs
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| − | "The most comprehensive study ever done on Al Qaeda."
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| − | —CBSNews.com
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| − | "An alarming, but important book on Al Qaeda."
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| − | —Wolf Blitzer, CNN
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| − | "[A] remarkable new study. . . . No one reading Gunaratna's book could be in any doubt that Al Qaeda is an awesome force."
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| − | —The Times (London)
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| − | "One of the few qualified to talk with authority about Al-Qaeda is Rohan Gunaratna, author of this excellent book. . . . He has interviewed more than 200 terrorists, including Al-Qaeda members, in dozens of countries, and read countless transcripts of intercepted communications, including calls made by Bin Laden himself. . . . It is one of the strengths of Gunaratna's book that he shows conclusively how disparate attacks against western interests all stemmed from the same source."
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| − | —The Sunday Times (London)
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| − | "Rohan Gunaratna succeeds.... His deep understanding of the mechanics of the menace has allowed him to wearve an account of how Al-Qaeda became--and remains--a threat."
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| − | —Financial Times (London)
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| − | "The most alarming conclusion to be drawn. . . is how little we really know about Al Qaeda."
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| − | —The Economist
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| − | Inside Al Qaeda examines the leadership, ideology, structure, strategies, and tactics of the most violent politico-religious organization the world has ever seen. The definitive work on Al Qaeda, this book is based on five years of research, including extensive interviews with its members; field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones in Central, South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East; and monitoring Al Qaeda infiltration of diaspora and migrant communities in North America and Europe.
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| − | Although founded in 1988, Al Qaeda merged with and still works with several other extremist groups. Hence Al Qaeda rank and file draw on nearly three decades of terrorist expertise. Moreover, it inherited a full-fledged training and operational infrastructure funded by the United States, European, Saudi Arabian and other governments for use in the anti-Soviet Jihad.
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| − | This book sheds light on Al Qaeda's financial infrastructure and how they train combat soldiers and vanguard fighters for multiple guerrilla, terrorist and semi-conventional campaigns in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucuses, and the Balkans. In addition, the author covers the clandestine Al Qaeda operational network in the West.
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| − | Gunaratna reveals:
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| − | how Osama bin Laden had his mentor and Al Qaeda founder, "Azzam", assassinated in order to take over the organization and that other Al Qaeda officers who stood in his way were murdered,
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| − | Al Qaeda's long-range, deep-penetration agent handling system in Western Europe and North America for setting up safe houses, procuring weapons, and conducting operations,
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| − | how the O55 Brigade, Al Qaeda's guerrilla organization, integrated into the Taliban,
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| − | how the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui forced Al Qaeda to move forward on September 11,
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| − | how a plan to destroy British Parliament on 9/11 and to use nerve gas on the European Union Parliament were thwarted,
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| − | how the Iran--Hezbollah--Al Qaeda link provided the knowledge to conduct coordinated, simultaneous attacks on multiple targets, including failed plans to destroy Los Angeles International Airport, the USS Sullivan, the Radisson Hotel in Jordan, and eleven US commercial airliners over the Pacific ocean,
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| − | that one-fifth of international Islamic charities and NGOs are infiltrated by Al Qaeda,
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| − | how the US response is effective militarily in the short term, but insufficient to counter Al Qaeda's ideology in the long-term.
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| − | Finally, to destroy Al Qaeda, Gunaratna shows there needs to be a multipronged, multiagency, and multidimensional response by the international community.
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| − | Contents
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| − | 1. Who is Osama bin Laden?
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| − | 2. Al Qaeda's Organisation, Ideology and Strategy
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| − | 3. Al Qaeda's Global Network
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| − | 4. Asia: Al Qaeda's New Theatre
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| − | 5. The Al Qaeda Threat and the International Response
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| − | About the Author
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| − | Rohan Gunaratna is research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and honorary fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel. Previously, he was principal investigator of the United Nations'Terrorism Prevention Branch, and he has served as a consultant on terrorism to several governments and corporations. He has been a visiting scholar at the University of Illinois, the University of Maryland, and the University of Notre Dame, and has lectured widely in Latin America,the Middle East, and Asia on terrorism and countermeasures. He is the author of six books on armed conflict.
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| − | On Rohan Gunaratna: the ‘Temple Drum’ of Terrorism Industry
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| − | by Sachi Sri Kantha
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| − | Introductory Note by Sri Kantha
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| − | The phrase ‘Temple drum’ (the English translation of a spicy colloquial phrase Kovil Melam in Eelam Tamil lingo) loses much in translation, unless one bothers to fathom the derisive bite it carries in the Tamil language. Kovil Melam refers to an inferior quality item of local origin - regularly seen ad nauseam, in contrast to a superior quality performer, invited specially as a guest for the occasion. The phrase originated in the realm of men musicians and women dancers of a voluptious variety, who provided daily service to the local temples. On festive occasions, the audience thronged the festival grounds in anticipation to listen to specially invited ranking artistes from Southern India, and they would be irritated and least interested in listening and observing their own ‘Temple Drums’.
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| − | In the international world of Intelligence analysts, Sri Lanka-born slick performer Rohan Gunaratna had transformed into the ‘Temple Drum’ of Terrorism Industry. Until recently, he had been a staple contributor to the parochial press in Colombo (the Island newspaper) and Chennai (the Frontline magazine) spewing his intelligence on LTTE activities like a camel which spits when it is irritated. Thus it is heartening to see that in a few cities, investigative journalists have begun to size up the quality of ‘intelligence’ delivered by Gunaratna. The camouflage and cloak of this slick artist had been scruitinised, and Gary Hughes had produced an expose for the Melbourne Age newspaper on July 20th.
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| − | One should give the devil his due. The expose by Gary Hughes reveals that Gunaratna has some peculiar talent for (a) social climbing, (b) academic imposturing, (c) name dropping and (d) vita forgery, by puffing his vita with non-existing positions. To appreciate the expose of Gary Hughes, it would be helpful if one first reads how the Temple Drum of Terrorism Industry paraded himself as the Emperor of the Terrorism Analyst. A good example of such a performance was Gunaratna’s interview, which appeared in Hugh Hefner’s Playboy magazine of November 2002. Thus, in this assembled anthology on Rohan Gunaratna, I provide the following publicly available material in series, and follow it with an end note on Sri Lanka’s other con persons who made some wave in the past.
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| − | Item 1: A Playboy magazine interview by Rohan Gunaratna [A Conversation with Rohan Gunaratna by Leopold Froehlich; Playboy magazine, November 2002, pp.72-74 & 147-150]
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| − | Item 2: The expose of Rohan Gunaratna’s credentials by the Melbourne Age newspaper (July 20, 2003)
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| − | Item 3: Rohan Gunaratna’s response to Melbourne Age’s expose in Channel News Asia com of July 21, 2003.
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| − | Item 4: Excerpts from the commentary by Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball on Terror Watch, in Newsweek Web exclusive feature, datelined July 9, 2003.
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| − | Due to the prominent role played by Rohan Gunaratna as a ‘know-all pundit’ on Pirabhakaran and LTTE, I believe that these items are of interest to the readers of sangam website. About his jaundiced views, I have openly criticized him in my Pirabhakaran Phenomenon series (parts 1-53). I had felt for long that Gunaratna do possess credentials as a certified Intelligence operative (for the Sri Lankan government), but is an academic impostor. Now, I’m somewhat relieved to see that my criticism on Gunaratna is substantiated by other Australian and American observers.
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| − | Item 1: Rohan Gunaratna’s Interview in the Playboy magazine
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| − | [Note by Sri Kantha: For reasons of convenience, I have tagged the questions with a serial number, to a total of 54 questions.] | |
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| − | Al Queda at Home, Our Home
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| − | “Rohan Gunaratna’s interest in Al Qaeda began with a series of visits to Pakistan in 1993. Since then he’s become the world’s foremost expert on Islamist terrorism. The Sri Lankan native has interviewed more than 200 Al Qaeda members and has written six books on armed conflict. From 2000 to 2001 he served as principal investigator for the United Nations’ Terrorism Prevention Branch. A consultant on terrorism to governments and corporations, Gunaratna travels extensively, this summer shuttling between the U.S., Singapore and Scotland, where he is a senior research fellow at the University of St.Andrews’ Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. His extraordinary new book, Inside Al Qaeda (Columbia University), demonstrates his profound understanding of terrorist mechanics. A surprise best-seller, it’s already regarded as the definitive work on Al Qaeda. Behind his gentle demeanor and even-handed scholarship, Gunaratna is unsparing in assessing the threat of Al Qaeda. This past summer he visited PLAYBOY’s Chicago offices and painted a disturbing picture of our domestic security in a conversation with Leopold Froehlich.
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| − | Playboy – Question 1: The September 11 hijackers lived undetected here for a year and a half. Are there more members in the U.S. now?
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| − | Gunaratna: Yes, there is an Al Qaeda presence. Al Qaeda has two types of cells in America. Support cells disseminate propaganda, recruit, raise funds and procure technologies. They’ll buy Osama bin Laden a satellite phone. They’ll find safe houses, rent vehicles and mount initial reconnaissance on future targets. The operational cells are the Mohamed Atta type of cells. When a target has already been identified, they will come. They do final reconnaissance or surveillance and execute the operation – assassination, bombing, suicide attack, whatever. Both types of cells are active. But now that there’s a state of alert in the U.S., most of the cells here are support cells. Operational cells are established before an attack, because operations are the most vulnerable to detection.
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| − | Playboy – Question 2: You’ve said you believe Bin Laden is alive in Pakistan. Do you expect him to go public again?
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| − | Gunaratna: Yes. It was in his interest to maintain ambiguity immediately after U.S. troops arrived in Afghanistan. But now that he’s stabilized himself he’ll make it known that he’s alive and Al Qaeda is alive.
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| − | Playboy – Question 3: What are the next Al Qaeda hot spots targeted here?
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| − | Gunaratna: Actually, the Midwest and New York-New Jersey are two active areas. But it’s likely that because Al Qaeda knows these locales are being watched they’ll establish a presence in other states also.
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| − | Playboy – Question 4: You say in your book that there’s a degree of sympathy with Al Qaeda’s objectives among American Muslims. How much sympathy, and with what specific pursuits?
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| − | Gunaratna: American Muslims don’t want to support terrorism, but there is a segment of the Muslim community that has been radicalized and politicized to a point that, although they live here, they would have no problem with witnessing another September 11. They’re angry with the U.S. and some of them are convinced the U.S. must be attacked. This fifth column of Al Qaeda in America is small, but they make it possible for Al Qaeda to operate here. The hijackers knew so much about how to behave in this country. How did they know that?
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| − | Playboy – Question 5: We’re told that Atta was well assimilated into American culture. How well does Al Qaeda actually understan this culture?
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| − | Gunaratna: They have a significant understanding of Western societies because they have penetrated them for at least 10 years. They have people in the West as their fifth column. Because of that, they know how to blend in.
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| − | Playboy – Question 6: Who is the typical Al Qaeda supporter in New Jersey, Michigan or Texas? Is he a doctor? A shopkeeper? Taxi driver?
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| − | Gunaratna: We can’t exactly say they are from a particular class. Al Qaeda is integrated vertically and horizontally in the Muslim communities. They have supporters, collaborators, sympathizers and members from all those levels. We know the core leadership usually comes from upper- and middle-class families. Bin Laden is from the richest nonroyal Saudi family. Ayman al Zawahiri, a pediatrician, is from an educated Egyptian family. But most of the membership comes from the lower ranks. The middle Al Qaedas, who are the experts, come from middle class families. They’ve attended universities.
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| − | Playboy – Question 7: What’s the appeal of Americans to Al Qaeda?
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| − | Gunaratna: U.S. passport holders arouse less suspicion when they cross borders. Retired and active military personnel work for or suppport Al Qaeda. For instance, Ali Mohamed trained Bin Laden’s bodyguards. He was part of an Al Qaeda team that included other retired U.S. military personnel who went to Bosnia to train and arm Muslims.
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| − | Playboy – Question 8: How does Al Qaeda work in the States?
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| − | Gunaratna: They rely on affiliates for support. Al Qaeda did not establish these organizations, many of which enjoy charitable status; they infiltrated them. Since September 11 the FBI has stepped up surveillance, freezing the funds of some U.S.-based Islamic organizations. The Benevolence International Foundation and the Global Relief Foundation, both based in Chicago, are currently being investigated by U.S. authorities for their alleged links with terrorists.
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| − | Playboy – Question 9: How did the BIF set up shop here?
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| − | Gunaratna: Adel Batterjee formed the Benevolence International Foundation in Florida in 1992. Shortly afterward he moved it to Chicago. Enaam Arnaout, a Syrian-born U.S.citizen, became the BIF’s American head, a post he continues to hold. Arnaout traveled widely, visiting the Balkans, the Caucasus and Asia, channeling U.S.-generated humanitarian support. Until it was raided by the feds last December, BIF Chicago supported an office in Peshawar, Pakistan. BIF Peshawar funded an orphanage near Kabul in Afghanistan. The patron of the orphanage is a former employee of the Taliban Foreign Ministry, with whom Bin Laden and his family stayed six months after they returned to Afghanistan.
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| − | Playboy – Question 10: Do former BIF members still operate in Chicago?
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| − | Gunaratna: When the FBI raided the BIF’s Chicago office, the search warrant named a well-known employee of MAK, the Afghan Service Bureau. From 1995 to 1998, another BIF Chicago employee gave radical speeches throughout the U.S. in support of jihads in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Before he left for Pakistan, where he now lives, this man founded another charity, Nasr Trust, also in Chicago. Although BIF’s funds were frozen, its office in Chicago continues to function. BIF raised $3.6 million in 2001.
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| − | Playboy – Question 11: That’s pretty amazing.
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| − | Gunaratna: The Global Relief Foundation is another Islamist organization that had its funds frozen. The GRF had an employee, also a U.S.citizen of Syrian descent, who was responsible for processing documents for Arab volunteers fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.
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| − | Playboy – Question 12: You’ve said Abdullah Azzam had 30 offices here to support the mujahidin in their war against the Soviets. Do these offices still exist?
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| − | Gunaratna: They do not exist as Al Qaeda offices or as Afghan relief offices. But there are certain mosques and Islamic institutions in this country that still pledge allegiance to Osama’s ideology. They advance those themes and objectives in a clandestine or deceptive way. They are clandestine even as far as the larger Muslim population is concerned.
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| − | Playboy – Question 13: As you’ve said, the executive director of the BIF in Chicago is a Syrian American. What about the Syrian community in Chicago?
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| − | Gnaratna: Many Muslims in Chicago support various Islamic charitable organizations without knowing they may be linked to Al Qaeda. I doubt that most people who support the BIF know its political mission. They just don’t know.
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| − | Playboy – Question 14: You’ve reported that 20 percent of Muslim charities have been corrupted. How has this been accomplished?
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| − | Gunaratna: When Al Qaeda identifies a nongovernmental organization, an Islamic registered charity, for instance, they send one or two of their people to join. Gradually, those people become prominent members of the organization. Eventually they control the funds. They largely work through deception in the U.S., but in the Philippines, for example, they use intimidation. If one man says, ‘We have to be more accountable’, they intimidate him. They will coerce him until he’s scared for his life, for his children. Most of the Al Qaeda-infiltrated charities – most of the front and sympathetic organizations of terrorist groups in the U.S.- are still operating. They work as human rights organizations, humanitarian or cultural organizations, social or educational groups.
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| − | Playboy – Question 15: Who contributes to these charities? In 2001, Illinois state tax filings for the BIF cite an $80,000 donation from someone who is listed as unknown and $225,000 from a person identified only as Muhammad. Shouldn’t that arouse suspicion?
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| − | Gunaratna: Well, that doesn’t conform to proper administrative and financial regulations, at least in spirit. The U.S. government has belatedly taken action against BIF. But there are several organizations like it. We know of several other terrorist groups operating here.
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| − | Playboy – Question 16: You’ve said donors in Saudi Arabia and Kuwat also don’t know where their charitable money is used.
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| − | Gunaratna: That’s because they don’t have a proper system. American and other Western institutions have procedures for accountability. Charities account for every cent. They maintain books here, but not in those countries.
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| − | Playboy – Question 17: Why have Americans become so vulnerable to attack?
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| − | Gunaratna: Americans were lulled into a false sense of security. Their isolationist mentality focused on guarding borders. Not on strategic threats. Sheikh Kabbani of the Islamic Supreme Council of America said in January 1999 that ‘extremist Islamists took over 80 percent of the mosques in the U.S.’ He said that the ideology of extremism has been spread to 80 percent of the Muslim population, mostly the youth. Because of the radicalization of some American Muslims by Islamist preachers, and because of the penetration of Muslim diasporas by foreign terrorists, the FBI infiltrated several American Muslim communities. But the prevailing view in law enforcement was that if American Muslims who support or participate in terrorism elsewhere didn’t harm American interests, nobody would act against them. Al Qaeda knew U.S. intelligence was monitoring Muslim communties here, so they moved the September 11 operational team away from Islamic strongholds in New Jersey and Illinois. They built a new network that had no connection with any of the U.S. networks that Bin Laden believed had been compromised by the FBI.
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| − | Playboy – Question 18: Should the U.S. government have had an inkling about what was going on?
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| − | Gunaratna: Certainly. Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, for example – Bin Laden’s brother-in-law – visited the States. When U.S. immigration detained him in San Franciso in December 1994, they found documents in his luggage that detailed the ‘outline of the institution of jihad’. These papers had titles like ‘The Wisdom of Assassination and Kidnapping’, ‘The Wisdom of Assassinating Priests and Christians’, ‘The Wisdom of Bombing Christian Churches and Places of Worship’. Khalifa was held without bail before he was subsequently extradited to Jordan for allegedly financing the 1994 bombing of a cinema there. He was later tried and acquitted on that charge. As Al Qaeda’s reported chief for Southeast Asia in the Nineties, Khalifa reportedly helped finance a plan to destroy 11 U.S. airliners over the Pacific, to crash an explosives-laden aircraft into the Pentagon and to assassinate President Clinton and the Pope in Manila. But until Khalifa was acquitted in Jordan, U.S. intelligence had no knowledge of his role in the plan. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, intelligence authorities arrested Khalifa in Saudi Arabia and later released him.
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| − | Playboy – Question 19: How has Al Qaeda altered their approach since the mid-Nineties?
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| − | Gunaratna: The quality of the September 11 operations was markedly different from earlier U.S.attacks. Without exception, the hijackers were handpicked for their willingness to kill and die for Allah. When you compare September 11 with the unsuccessful attempt to bomb Los Angeles International Airport in December 1999, Al Qaeda has improved in almost every aspect. Realizing the threat of terrorist infiltration from Canada, with its relaxed immigration policy, the Americans tightened security along the border and instigated measures to protect key public buildings from car bombs. So Al Qaeda got their operatives into the U.S. by commercial airline, carrying correct identity papers and with sound alibis for their presene. Al Qaeda had originally planned the attack for September 9, but because of unknown operational constraints, the attack was postponed.
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| − | Playboy – Question 20: Were any future Al Qaeda members trained at the John F.Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in Fort Bragg, North Carolina?
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| − | Gunaratna: Ali Mohamed was. He was a captain in the Egyptian military who came to the U.S. for advanced training. He received training at the John F.Kennedy Center. He came back again and joined the U.S.Army and attained the rank of sergeant in the Special Forces. He was a member of Al Qaeda. As I pointed out, he trained Bin Laden’s bodyguards. He trained the teams that operated in Somalia, Bosnia and Afghanistan.
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| − | Playboy – Question 21: Did the hijackers follow their instructions?
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| − | Gunaratna: To the letter. Being advised to keep physically fit and mentally alert, they joined gyms. Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehli went to a health club in Decatur, Georgia. Ziad Jarrah did likewise in Florida, where he took martial arts lessons, including kickboxing and knife fighting. Al Qaeda anticipated that passengers might attack.. So the hijackers were ordered to build body strength. Until a month before the operation, the hijackers had planned to threaten or, if necessary, use knives to gain control of the aircraft. An Al Qaeda group had used a knife to seize an Indian Airlines plane in 1999. Al Qaeda realized that the scheme could be compromised if team members were caught trying to smuggle knives aboard. So they carried box cutters that were less than four inches long, which were permitted by the Federal Aviation Administration. Other than pepper sprays, the box cutters were the only weapons carried by the hijackers.
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| − | Playboy – Question 22: How else did they prepare?
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| − | Gunaratna: All the cells independently acquired flight deck simulation videos. Atta bought videos and other items from Sporty’s, a pilot store in suburban Cincinnati. Nawaf al-Hazmi also obtained flight deck videos from the same store. Rehearsing was another central precept of Al Qaeda doctrine. Atta and al-Shehhi took a flight-check ride around Decatur in February 2001, and Jarrah did likewise at a flight school in Fort Lauderdale. They repeatedly took the same flight to familiarize themselves with airport security and cockpit access.
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| − | Playboy – Question 23: Did all the hijackers come from abroad specifically for the attack?
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| − | Gunaratna: No. Al Qaeda recruited and trained Hani Hanjour, a Saudi national who had come to the U.S. in 1996 to study English. In 2001, Hanjour attended pilot-training courses in Arizona and Maryland.
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| − | Playboy – Question 24: How did Zacarias Moussaoui’s arrest affect the operation?
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| − | Gunaratna: It forced them to move up the schedule. Although Al Qaeda strives to train agents who disclose nothing to captors, they were aware of the danger to the operation. Moussaoui was one of the few suspected terrorists who knew about both the Hamburg and the Kuala Lumpur cells. But the FBI failed to examine his computer before September 11. With the imminent threat of being compromised, Al Qaeda’s cells stepped up final preparations within a week of Moussaoui’s arrest. On August 22, Fayez Ahmed used his Visa card in Florida to get the cash that had been deposited in his Standard Chartered Bank account in the United Arab Emirates the day before. That same day, Jarrah purchased global positioning equipment and schematics for cockpit instruments. From August 25 to August 29, the hijackers got their airline tickets with credit cards or online – except Khalid Almihdhar and Majed Moqed of American Airlines flight 77. Their Visa card didn’t match their mailing address, so they had to drive to Baltimore-Washington International Airport and pay cash for two one-way tickets.
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| − | Playboy – Question 25: Good to see the security worked. Did these men know they were going to die?
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| − | Gunaratna: Well, Atta sent a Fed Ex package from Florida to Dubai in early September. It’s likely that it contained his farewell message to the head of his Al Qaeda family.
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| − | Playboy – Question 26: It sounds like they covered all the bases.
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| − | Gunaratna: Al Qaeda also prepared a backup team to attack the World Trade Center, and had two other teams of trained pilots and hijackers poised to strike targets in India, Britain and Australia as well.
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| − | Playboy – Question 27: In helping the anti-Soviet jihad, did the CIA help Islamic radicals here? As you point out, Abdullah Azzam came to lecture in America. Did U.S. intelligence sponsor radical lectures in American mosques?
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| − | Gunaratna: The Afghan Service Bureau didn’t receive any money from the CIA. Its office got money from the Gulf countries and from Muslim immigrants.
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| − | Playboy – Question 28: What about through Pakistani intelligence, the ISI?
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| − | Gunaratna: The ISI did give assistance. The CIA gave weapons to the ISI, and the CIA gave millions of dollars to Pakistani intelligence. The ISI did the training. I know this because I’ve spoken to the ISI. I spent a lot of time with them. People say the CIA supported Al Qaeda. But the CIA never did. The CIA gave assistance to ISI. And the ISI gave money to all these groups.
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| − | Playboy – Question 29: Has Osama bin Laden’s family really disowned him?
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| − | Gunaratna: Absolutely – except for one member, his brother-in-law Khalifa. No one else in the family supports him.
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| − | Playboy – Question 30: You said it’s unlikely Al Qaeda could mount a biological or nuclear attack but that it could mount a chemical or a radiological attack. Is that still true?
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| − | Gunaratna: Yes. Al Qaeda has tried to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. But as a terrorist group, it’s difficult to get nuclear and biological material. So it’s likely they will acquire and use chemical or radiological weapons.
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| − | Playboy – Question 31: How much did the Afghan war hurt Al Qaeda? How much did the bombings and the U.S. military intervention affect it?
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| − | Gunaratna: They completely destroyed Al Qaeda’s infrastructure. Training infrastructure is critical for the continuation of any terrorist conflict, because you have to constantly train members, both ideologically and physically. We know the bombs destroyed the infrastructure. When the quality of the Al Qaeda fighter becomes poor, he is vulnerable to detection. His operational security will be poor, so the efficiency of operations goes down. Also, the bombings have already demoralized Al Qaeda supporters, sympathizers and many of its members.
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| − | Playboy – Question 32: Are there currently any native-born Al Qaeda members?
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| − | Gunaratna: Yes. We know there are from several interrogation reports and arrests. Even before September 11 we knew from the East Africa bombings that there are Americans in Al Qaeda. We know some of them even trained Bosnian Muslims.
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| − | Playboy – Question 33: If that’s the case, wouldn’t it be possible for Americans to infiltrate? If it’s conceivable that John Walker Lindh can become a Taliban member, can’t the FBI recruit infiltrators?
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| − | Gunaratna: Yes. But the FBI and the CIA lack creativity. They don’t want to take a risk. When you are working with clandestine agents, sometimes you have to terminate them. They don’t want to dirty their hands. I was a foreign-policy fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. My faculty adviser was Stanfield Turner. I love the man. I respect him because he’s an honest man. But the only disagreement I ever had with him was why he got rid of various clandestine programs when he was director of operations in the CIA. He later realized what he did was a mistake. America lost its eyes and ears.
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| − | Playboy – Question 34: Has the FBI or any other intelligence agency infiltrated Al Qaeda?
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| − | Gunaratna: They’re trying their best now, and they will.
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| − | Playboy – Question 35: You’ve said that you think the French have infiltrated Al Qaeda.
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| − | Gunaratna: They have. They have infiltrated Al Qaeda for a long time. The French are good. Of all the Western intelligence agencies, they’re the best on Al Qaeda. Among Arab countries, Jordan and Egypt have the best intelligence.
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| − | Playboy – Question 36: In Inside Al Qaeda you write about the lifespans of terrorist groups. How long will Al Qaeda survive?
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| − | Gunaratna: It depends on how the U.S. and the international community respond. If you rigorously pursue a group, you can destroy it. I’d say in five years we will be able to destroy Al Qaeda. Five years is average. CIA infiltrated Hezbollah in five years, although that was peripheral infiltration. But now, with so much energy going into counterterrorism, I believe that in the next one or two years there will be good infiltration of these groups. That will enable us to destroy them.
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| − | Playboy – Question 37: How long should it take the FBI and CIA to catch up in terms of human intelligence? How long will it take the FBI to get Arabic-speaking agents?
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| − | Gunaratna: Since September 11 they have started to recruit immigrants as well as Americans skilled in languages. They hadn’t done that before in sufficient volume.
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| − | Playboy – Question 38: How reliable is Abu Zubaydah, who’s now in custody?
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| − | Gunaratna: He’ll never tell the truth. I know him. I listened to his communications before he was captured. He will never compromise his organization. Even if he’s cut into small pieces, he won’t. But, also, it’s in the interest of federal agents to say Abu Zubaydah is cooperating. If you say one of the key guys in Al Qaeda is cooperating, it demoralizes others. It drives fear into others: Oh, our leader is exposing us.
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| − | Playboy – Question 39: Why has there been so little effective counterpropaganda?
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| − | Gunaratna: Americans are clean people. They think black propaganda is something bad. It’s big mistake. The American people themselves killed the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Influence. They should never have done that. That office would have been central to fighting Al Qaeda. Americans must understand that when you deal with a secret organization, a terrorist group that has no principles, you have to undertake black operations – especially when you face a high threat.
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| − | Playboy – Question 40: How long would it take for an OSI-type office to be effective? Could it be done quickly?
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| − | Gunaratna: The people who know the threat want to do it. But there is some resistance. In five years you will produce world-class intelligence operatives, because young people have seen the suffering of Americans.
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| − | Playboy – Question 41: Considering the presence of Saudis in Al Qaeda, especially in the September 11 operation, is there any connection between terrorist supporters and U.S. financial interests? Quite a few major American corporations have longstanding relationships with Saudi Arabians.
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| − | Gunaratna: Well, the Saudi system tacitly aids terrorism in a big way. Naturally, the organizations that work with the Saudi system indirectly, without their knowledge, contribute to this. Think about it: American troops kill three to five Al Qaeda members a week in Afghanistan, but the Saudi system produces may be two dozen Al Qaeda members every week.
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| − | Playboy – Question 42: The Sudanese government supposedly offered to turn Osama bin Laden over to the U.S.
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| − | Gunaratna: Yes.
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| − | Playboy – Question 43: And the feds said no?
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| − | Gunaratna: They said no because they didn’t have sufficient evidence to prosecute him. It’s very unfortunate. And, of course, a year before, the Sudanese offered Carlos the Jackal to the French government. And Carlos the Jackal is now in France in custody. Bin Laden was afraid to stay in Sudan after that. He was worried the same thing would happen to him.
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| − | Playboy – Question 44: You say that American troops should leave the Arabian peninsula. But aren’t the troops there to protet the Saudi royal family as much as they are to defend American interests? Would the regime be at risk from theocratic forces if the soldiers left?
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| − | Gunaratna: The regime will definitely be threatened, but not now. Maybe in five years, if the Saudis don’t do a proper job cleaning up. More than catching the terrorists in Saudi Arabia, you must restructure a system that produces terrorists, that produces youths vulnerable to propaganda and indoctrination. Saudis are becoming sympathizers, supporters, collaborators and members of terrorist groups.
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| − | Playboy – Question 45: Has Al Qaeda been successful in bridging the Shia-Sunni divide?
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| − | Gunaratna: Yes. To target a common enemy. Al Qaeda has gone beyond the ideological divide, which is unprecedented. In fact, the world’s two most dangerous groups are Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, a Shia group and a Sunni group that now work together.
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| − | Playboy – Question 46: Is there any potential for disunity – ideological, factional or political – among al Qaeda?
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| − | Gunaratna: As long as Osama bin Laden is alive, there will be unity. When he’s removed, there will be so much infighting. Bin Laden is a good diplomat. He can bring people together and give them a dream to follow, a vision and a mission.
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| − | Playboy – Question 47: There are a lot of disenfranchised youths in the Islamic world. How much does demographics – a surfeit of people under the age of 20 – help Al Qaeda?
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| − | Gunaratna: The young are most vulnerable to radicalization. Even if they’re educated, they can’t find employment. Or they will be underemployed. These are the people who join Al Qaeda. They want to attack, attack, attack. We see that mentality; Kill the Americans; Death to America. Those kinds of slogans come mostly from young people. In the case of Al Qaeda, the demography will not change in the Middle East.
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| − | Playboy – Question 48: Do you see a possibility for a reform movement in the Muslim world?
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| − | Gunaratna: The fight against Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations and Islamic radicalism should, essentially, be waged by moderate Muslims, because moderate Muslims are the most threatened. They are in danger of having their values taken away. But they don’t have the willpower or the ability to do it. That’s why the West must work with moderate regimes and people.
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| − | Playboy – Question 49: Is there a reform movement that would be able to counter the radical Islamist tendency, a counter-reformation away from the Wahhabi, away from fundamentalism?
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| − | Gunaratna: The Saudi royal family is under pressure to change that system now, because they know their system spawns and sustains terrorism. But will they be able to do it? That’s the biggest question. Can the West persuade them? We have not seen signs of their doing it.
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| − | Playboy – Question 50: Can the madrassas be changed?
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| − | Gunaratna: Egypt is reforming its madrassas in a big way. And Algeria has reformed. Algeria says every madrassa and mosque must be registered. Pakistan has also started to do this.
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| − | Playboy – Question 51: Tell us about the encryption systems. Al Qaeda’s e-mails were secure. How did they know the National Security Agency couldn’t break their encryption software?
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| − | Gunaratna: I don’t know how Al Qaeda knew. But less than five percent of their communications are decipherable, because they’re using the commercially available Pretty Good Privacy. Al Qaeda had a special school in Afghanistan to train people to use computers, to use encryption. Terrorists have produced many computer viruses, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and they continually target European and North American countries. They are waging a war against the information infrastructure. Al Qaeda does this with simple means, buying programs off the shelf.
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| − | Playboy – Question 52: What’s your personal impression of Al Qaeda members who you’ve interviewed? Are they wild-eyed fanatics? Are they zealots?
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| − | Gunaratna: Actually, there is an A team and a B team. Members of the A team are the highly trained, highly motivated cool guys. They are icemen. The B-team guys are hotheads. Al Qaeda doesn’t care for them. They are expendable assets. The Al Qaeda manual for explosives says you must never give explosives training to a hothead, because he will blow himself up and blow up other Al Qaeda members and supporters. Always pick the right man for the right job. One category is expendable, the other is not.
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| − | Playboy – Question 53: But you wouldn’t want to mess with either of them.
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| − | Gunaratna: The ones you have to watch out for are the Takfirs, who came out of Egypt in the late Sixties. Takfir believers can deviate from Muslim practices to blend in with infidels. They will drink scotch with you, go to topless bars.
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| − | Playboy – Question 54: How safe are we now?
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| − | Gunaratna: The U.S. remains a vulnerable society. The threat of terrorism is still high. The only sure way to protect America – short of destroying Al Qaeda’s entire infrastructure abroad, an objective likely to remain unattainable – is for the FBI and other agencies to step up recruitment of agents from migrant Muslim communities. That’s how they can penetrate Al Qaeda’s core leadership.”
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| − | Thus ended Gunaratna’s secondary-rank interview in the Playboy magazine. Some of his stated positions were idiosyncratic and tasteless [for e.g; in response to Question 46, where Gunaratna gives a positive spin for Osama bin Laden, leaving one to guess for a moment whether Gunaratna was in fact a closet admirer of Al Qaeda. In addition, Gunaratna’s answer to Question 38 is also perplexing. The question was: ‘How reliable is Abu Zubaydah, who’s now in custody?’ According to Gunaratna: “He’ll never tell the truth. I know him. I listened to his communications before he was captured. He will never compromise his organization.”. Finding out, how did Gunaratna came to “know” him may be of some interest. Gunaratna has also stated that he “listened to” the communications of Abu Zubaydah. In what language, I wonder? If one presumes that Abu Zubaydah would have spoken in Arabic and not in English, I have no evidence that Gunaratna has mastered Arabic.
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| − | Gunaratna’s answer to Question 33 is a revelation of his personality. Is it a Freudian slip that he had blurted: “the FBI and the CIA lack creativity. They don’t want to take a risk. When you are working with clandestine agents, sometimes you have to terminate them….” He is a crumb who owes his current status to the ‘crumbs’ he gulped from the FBI and CIA transcripts. Then, he had the temerity to foul-mouth his benefactors. More importantly note the use of his euphemistic verb ‘terminate’ for killing. Who gave him the license to advocate killing? Is his sick mind any different from that of real terrorists?
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| − | The Kuala Lumpur Summit Redux
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| − | “Was master terrorist Khalid Shaikh Mohammed at an Al Qaeda ‘planning’ summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in January 2000 that was being secretly monitored by the Malaysian secret services – all under the watchful eyes of CIA?
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| − | That surprising claim was made today by Rohan Gunaratna, a widely resepcted academic expert on Al Qaeda who claims to have had access to top-secret U.S.intelligence ‘debriefs’ of captured Al Qaeda terrorists. Gunaratna was an initial witness at a public hearing conducted by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
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| − | Gunaratna, who said he was specifically reviewed transcripts of the interrogations of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed since his capture in Pakistan last March, testified that Mohammed actually ‘chaired’ the meeting of 12 Al Qaeda principals in which the September 11 plot and other future Al Qaeda attacks were discussed. But agency spokesman Bill Harlow flatly refuted the academic’s testimony today, saying the agency can now say for certain that the alleged 9-11 mastermind wasn’t present. ‘He’s totally incorrect,’ said Harlow about Gunaratna. ‘He got it wrong.’
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| − | The issue is far from academic. The CIA has previously acknowledged that it had asked the Malaysian ‘Special Branch’ to monitor the Kuala Lumpur summit and that the agency even received secret photographs of the Al Qaeda terrorists meeting there. (Immediately after the meeting, two of those present, 9-11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi, flew from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok and then onto Los Angeles. That information was soon known to the CIA but never passed along to other U.S.-law enforcement and border agencies that could have placed the two men on a terrorist ‘watch list’ and tracked their activities inside the United States.)
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| − | If true, Gunaratna’s claims about Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9-11 scheme was hatched – and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, doing the plotting.But Harlow said Gunaratna may have simply been confused because of those who was present, a high ranking Al Qaeda operative named Tawfiq bin Attash, had the nickname of ‘Khalled’. And the hijacker, Al-Mihdhar, had the first name Khalid. ‘Let’s hope the rest of the commission’s witnesses do better.’ said Harlow.”
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| − | End Note by Sri Kantha
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| − | According to this Newsweek web exclusive commentary by Isikoff and Hosenball, Dr.Gunaratna “claims to have had access to top-secret U.S.intelligence debriefs of captured Al Qaeda terrorists.” Then, how come the CIA spokesman contradicts the testimony of the Temple Drum of terrorism industry? Is it unreasonable to assume that either Gunaratna or the CIA spokesman is finagling with truth?
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| − | Or could it be that the U.S. intelligence operatives initially fed Dr.Gunaratna with not so-accurate ‘debriefs’ so that he ‘being a media-friendly analyst’ could disperse some misinformation for mutual benefit of both parties? In my thinking, Gunaratna’s cryptic response [‘Yes, that is entirely possible,’ came the surprisingly candid reply. ‘I am only human after all.’] to the question of correspondent of Channel News Asia Com. whether “has he been used by governments to push their agenda, as suggested in the article?”, hides much truth than what has been revealed.
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| − | Let me put things in perspective. Whatever Sri Lanka lacks, occasionally it produces charlatans and forgers who make some wave at the international scene. Rohan Gunaratna is not the first one in this game. In 1951, J.R.Jayewardene (then, a young Cabinet minister) made a wave as the ‘benefactor of Japan’ at the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and plodded this nugget laboriously to his Sinhalese audience and local journalists for decades. In reality, his role was a minor one – that of a bucket-carrier to the then U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) - and spewing mud at Andrei Gromyko (1909-1989), the then chief Soviet delegate at the United Nations, in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War games. There were two reasons why Jayewardene was not exposed as a con man. One is that Dulles, the mastermind behind Jayewardene’s podium act had died in the 1950s, before Jayewardene gained power in Sri Lanka. Secondly, the majority of the Japanese (even the politicians, diplomats and journalists) hardly read the English press in which Jayewardene had bragged about his big role as the benefactor of Japan.
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| − | In the 1960s, there was one Dr.Emil Savundra, the infamous insurance swindler. He was caught and legally punished in Britain. In 1982, there was a con man Sepala Ekanayake, who hijacked an Alitalia plane in Bangkok, by fooling the airport security personnel and airline passengers with the
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| − | message that he had bomb strapped to his body. Ekanayake was even successful in receiving 300,000 US dollars for his con act, and when he landed in Colombo received a ‘hero welcome’ from the gullibles for his stupendous feat.
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| − | In late 1990s, none other than the current Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga was ‘caught’ for her vita forgery of embellishing her ‘Paris period’ by the vigilant editor of the Sunday Leader. If Chandrika Kumaratunga, like one of her predecessors J.R.Jayewardene, did the vita forgery for impressing her dim-witted local fans, it was left to Rohan Gunaratna to trick the international press and emerge as an academic impostor at the global podia. Isn’t it somewhat ironic that because he was busy browsing with all the ‘intelligence materials’ and posturing as a world-class intelligence analyst, Gunaratna had hardly bothered to take to his heart - an unblemished gem of an intelligent advice offered by Abe Lincoln, which is available in any standard quotation book: ‘You can fool all the people for some time; some people for all the time; but you can’t fool all the people all the time.’
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| − | August 12, 2003. [Sri Kantha, Sachi [http://www.Sangam.org/ANALYSIS/sachi_9_12_03htm On Rohan Gunaratna:'The Temple drum' of terrorism indusrty.]
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