Ahmed Chalabi

Dr. Ahmed Chalabi (also spelled "Ahmad") is part of a three-man leadership council for the Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which was created at the behest of the U.S. government for the purpose of fomenting the overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

Chalabi, a secular Iraqi Shiite Muslim and mathematician by training, previously served as chairman of the Petra Bank in Jordan, where he engaged in various cloak-and-dagger operations that ended abruptly in August 1989 when he fled the country "under mysterious circumstances" and in 1992 was convicted in absentia for embezzlement, fraud and currency-trading irregularities, sentencing him to 22 years' hard labour. [1],[2]

In August 2003 a petition was circulating among Jordanian deputies to hold a special session soon in the 110-member house to demand the government take legal steps to seek Chalabi's extradition from Iraq. [3]

During 2004 Chalabi's influence with the U.S. has waned to the point where government funding for him is likely to be discontinued.

History

In March 2002, Seymour Hersh reported in The New Yorker that "A dispute over Chalabi's potential usefulness preoccupies the bureaucracy" within the U.S. government, "as the civilian leadership in the Pentagon continues to insist that only the INC can lead the opposition. At the same time, a former Administration official told me, 'Everybody but the Pentagon and the office of the Vice-President wants to ditch the INC.' The INC's critics note that Chalabi, despite years of effort and millions of dollars in American aid, is intensely unpopular today among many elements in Iraq. 'If Chalabi is the guy, there could be a civil war after Saddam's overthrow,' one former CIA operative told me. A former high-level Pentagon official added, 'There are some things that a President can't order up, and an internal opposition is one.'" [4]

Notwithstanding these concerns, Hersh reported that "INC supporters in and around the Administration, including Paul Dundes Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, believe, like Chalabi, that any show of force would immediately trigger a revolt against Saddam within Iraq, and that it would quickly expand." In December 2002, Robert Dreyfuss reported that the administration of George Walker Bush actually preferred INC-supplied analyses of Iraq over analyses provided by long-standing analysts within the CIA. "Even as it prepares for war against Iraq, the Pentagon is already engaged on a second front: its war against the Central Intelligence Agency.," he wrote. "The Pentagon is bringing relentless pressure to bear on the agency to produce intelligence reports more supportive of war with Iraq. ... Morale inside the U.S. national-security apparatus is said to be low, with career staffers feeling intimidated and pressured to justify the push for war." Much of the pro-war faction's information came from the INC, even though "most Iraq hands with long experience in dealing with that country's tumultuous politics consider the INC's intelligence-gathering abilities to be nearly nil. ... The Pentagon's critics are appalled that intelligence provided by the INC might shape U.S. decisions about going to war against Baghdad. At the CIA and at the State Department, Ahmed Chalabi, the INC's leader, is viewed as the ineffectual head of a self-inflated and corrupt organization skilled at lobbying and public relations, but not much else." [5]

"The [INC's] intelligence isn't reliable at all," said Vincent Cannistraro, a former senior CIA official and counterterrorism expert. "Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear. And much of it is used to support Chalabi's own presidential ambitions. They make no distinction between intelligence and propaganda, using alleged informants and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating] cooked information that goes right into presidential and vice-presidential speeches." [6]

In February 2003, as the Bush administration neared the end of its preparations for war, an internal fight erupted over INC's plan to actually become the government of Iraq after the U.S. invasion. Chalabi wanted to "declare a provisional government when the war starts," a plan that "alienated some of Mr Chalabi's most enthusiastic backers in the Pentagon and in Congress, who fear the announcement of a provisional government made up of exiles would split anti-Saddam sentiment inside Iraq." [7]

"What he did was pander to the dreams of a group of powerful men, centered in the Pentagon, the Defense Policy Board, the vice president's office, and various think tanks scattered around Washington,² according to Thomas Engelhardt, a New York writer who produces a daily web log on the war.

The thing that needs to be grasped here is that since 1991 these men have been dreaming up a storm about reconfiguring the Middle East, while scaling the heavens (via various Star Wars programs for the militarization of space), and so nailing down an American earth for eternity. Their dreams were utopian and so, by definition, unrealizable. Theirs were lava dreams, and they were dreamt, like all such burning dreams, without much reference to the world out there. They were perfect pickings for a Chalabi.

Of course, the fact that Chalabi is now scarcely mentioned as a possible political force in Iraq is barely acknowledged by the hawks who still insist, albeit with less conviction, that things are going their way and that there is no reason to panic.

--Jim Lobe, 11 July 2003 [8]

In July 2003 Chalabi was one of nine Iraqi Governing Council members chosen to serve as president for a month of the U.S.- backed, self-rule body. [9]

Chalabi even participated in a secret Defense Policy Board meeting just a few days after the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon in which the main topic of discussion, according to the 'Wall Street Journal', was how 9/11 could be used as a pretext for attacking Iraq. [10]

Jim Lobe reports on 20 Februrary 2004 to IPS  that "It appears that Chalabi, whose family, it was reported this week, has extensive interests in a company that has already been awarded more than 400 million dollars in reconstruction contracts, is signalling his willingness to take all of the blame, or credit, for the faulty intelligence." [11]

Fall from Grace?

In May 2004, Newsweek reported that a White House official accused Chalabi of "playing footsie" with Iranians. "Top Bush administration officials have been briefed on intelligence indicating that Chalabi and some of his top aides have supplied Iran with 'sensitive' information on the American occupation in Iraq," Mark Hosenball wrote. "U.S. officials say that electronic intercepts of discussions between Iranian leaders indicate that Chalabi and his entourage told Iranian contacts about American political plans in Iraq. There are also indications that Chalabi has provided details of U.S. security operations." [12]

Ahead of the June 30, 2004, transfer of 'sovereignty' from the U.S to an interim Iraqi administration, it was reported that both the U.S. administrator and the United Nations envoy to Iraq see no role for Chalabi. The Washington Post also reported that the U.S. government is likely to end the $US340,000 monthly contribution to the INC. [13]

Not only has the United States government "decided to halt monthly $335,000 payments to the Iraqi National Congress, the group headed by Ahmad Chalabi," which was announced by "an official with the group" on Monday, May 17, 2004, but U.S. military personnel and Iraqi police also raided the Iraqi National Congress compound and Chalabi's home on May 20th. [14]

Chalbi's nephew, Salem Chalabi, "who serves as Iraq's war crimes prosecutor, said the U.S. military personnel and Iraqi police entered his uncle's home with their weapons drawn, and threatened Chalabi's security personnel. ... Describing what his uncle told him, Salim said the forces were 'looking for something; and were upset with Chalabi. ... The forces also cordoned off the Iraqi National Congress headquarters in a separate building nearby, taking guns away from the security there, Salim said." [15]

The Washington Post reports that "U.S. troops detained three guards and seized computers, dozens of rifles, and files from the offices of the INC, a coalition of parties headed by Chalabi that opposed Saddam Hussein from exile.

"Hours after the morning raids, a U.S. official and an Iraqi judge disclosed to reporters that arrest warrants had been issued for 15 people on charges of kidnapping, fraud and 'associated matters.'

"Eight of the people on the list have been declared fugitives, the judge said. Each of them is associated with the INC. The judge said the men had illegally detained and tortured people, stolen government cars for personal use and illegally taken over government facilities."

"Chalabi, at a news conference later, was furious. 'They invaded the home of a Governing Council member a few days after the president of the Governing Council was blown up by terrorist actions at an American checkpoint,' he said, according to the Associated Press." [16]

Chalabi "said U.S. officials disliked his opposition to former members of Hussein's Baath Party, his efforts to investigate kickbacks paid by foreigners to Hussein under the UN Oil-for-Food Program and his demands for full Iraqi control over the armed forces after a U.S. handover of limited sovereignty, planned for June 30. (See Iraqi sovereignty: June 30, 2004.)

"Now [Chalabi] says that with the liberation of Iraq, the United States should get out of the way. 'My message is let my people go, let my people be free, ... We are grateful to President Bush for liberating Iraq, but it is time for the Iraqi people to run their affairs.'" [17]

"The raids appeared to complete Chalabi's fall from grace in the eyes of U.S. officials over the last difficult year of the occupation." [18]

However, Robert Dreyfuss says that "it's all a big con game" and the "still-neocon-dominated Pentagon--which this week stopped funding Chalabi's INC --is playing its last card, hoping that it can boost Chalabi's sagging fortunes by pretending to sever ties with him. That, the neocons hope, will allow Chalabi to strengthen his ties to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, the king-making mullah who, they hope, holds Iraq's fate in his wrinkled hands." [19]

Also see:

• "America's 'Best Friend' A Spy?", CBS News/AP, May 20, 2004.
• Andrew Cockburn, "The Truth About Ahmed Chalabi," CounterPunch, May 20, 2004: "Why the US Turned Against Their Former Golden Boy -- He was Preparing a Coup! What He Did as a Catspaw for Tehran: How He Nearly Bankrupted Jordan; the Billions He Stands to Make Out of the New Iraq"

SourceWatch Resources

• Salem Chalabi (Ahmed's nephew and second-generation U.S. favorite)
• civil war in Iraq
• Iraqi sovereignty: June 30, 2004
• war profiteering

External links

• "An Interview with Dr. Ahmad Chalabi," from "Frontline: The Survival of Saddam," PBS, January 25, 2000.
• Robert Dreyfuss, Tinker, Banker, NeoCon, Spy. Ahmed Chalabi's long and winding road from (and to?) Baghdad, The American Prospect, November 18, 2002.
• Warren P. Strobel, "Plan to give Iraqi exiles big role spurs feud," Mercury News, March 27, 2003.
• Christophe Boltanski, "How the Dissidents Fooled the Washington Hawks," La Liberation, April 1, 2003.
• Eric Schmitt and Steven R. Weisman, U.S. to Recruit Iraqi Civilians to Interim Posts, The New York Times, April 10, 2003. Numerous references to Chalabi.
• "Fresh bank scandals hit Iraq's leader in waiting," Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 2003.
• Marian Wilkinson and Peter Fray, "The thief of Baghdad", Sydney Morning Herald, May 9, 2003.
• Jim Lobe, "Analysis: Anatomy of a Quack-Mire", Inter Press Service, July 11, 2003.
• "War, Truth and Consequences," PBS Frontline, October 9, 2003, includes a lengthy interview with Chalabi.
• Knut Royce, Start-up Company With Connections. U.S. gives $400M in work to contractor with ties to Pentagon favorite on Iraqi Governing Council, Newsday, February 15, 2004: "... to a start-up company that has extensive family and, according to court documents, business ties to Ahmed Chalabi, ... The most recent contract, for $327 million to supply equipment for the Iraqi Armed Forces, was awarded last month and drew an immediate challenge from a losing contester, who said the winning bid was so low that it questions the 'credibility' of that bid."
• "Iraq's Chalabi Says 'Blame CIA, Not Me' About WMD," Reuters, March 5, 2004.
• Isabel Hilton, "Ready to rule, despite his errors", Sydney Morning Herald, March 10, 2004.
• Tabassum Zakaria, "Exile group still on US payroll", The Age, March 12, 2004: "The US is still paying the Iraqi National Congress exile group, headed by Ahmed Chalabi, about $US340,000 ($A450,000) a month for intelligence - despite internal government reviews finding that much of the intelligence provided before the war was faulty or even fabricated..."
• Dexter Filkins, "Chalabi, Nimble Exile, Searches for Role in Iraq," New York Times, March 26, 2004.
• Mark Hosenball and Michael Hirsh, "Chalabi: A Questionable Use of U.S. Funding", Newsweek, April 5, 2004: "Under investigation: Congress is examining whether Ahmad Chalabi inappropriately used U.S. taxpayer dollars to prod America towards war in Iraq."
• Timothy M. Phelps, "U.S. backing knocked," New York Newsday, April 22, 2004. Kenneth Pollack, a former Clinton administration official and one of the most prominent Democrats to support the war in Iraq, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday that it was a 'disgrace' that the United States 'continues to push [Ahmed Chalabi] the way we do' for a leadership position in Iraq. Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Vice Chairman Joseph Biden (D-Del.) said they agreed with Pollack."
• "Transcript: Ahmed Chalabi on 'Fox News Sunday', April 25, 2004.
• Robin Wright and Walter Pincus, "Washington's chosen ones face the axe", Sydney Morning Herald, April 26, 2004. (This is a syndicated story originally published in the Washington Post).
• "Chalabi says no to U.N. oversight", Washington Times, April 29, 2004.
• Joshua Micah Marshall, More on Chalabi, Talking Points Memo, May 2, 2004.
• Mark Hosenball, "Intelligence: A Double Game," Newsweek, May 10, 2004.